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THE IMPACT OF STATE LAW ON
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
Robert C. Bartlett*
T E FEDERAL income tax law ostensibly provides a uniform sys-
tem of taxation of nationwide scope, applying equally to all
who come within the varied classifications set up by Congress.
But the present statute, just as in 1913 when the first constitu-
tional income tax was imposed, is superimposed upon a kaleido-
scopic pattern of, state laws which differ from state to state. To
the extent that these state laws affect federal income tax liability,
the federal revenue system is far from uniform for federal tax
liability differs with the state boundaries. In fact, as one author
notes :
Much of our federal tax law is not federal tax law at all, but
non-tax state law. Simplification talk is little more than the
expression of pious hope unless it takes account of the fact
that only in a limited sense do we have a "nationwide scheme
of taxation." We shall get nowhere rapidly with the problem
of simplification until we recognize that what we bravely call
uniformity on a national scale is a myth.'
* Member, Illinois Bar; A. B. Williams College, Ll.B. Chicago-Kent College of
Law.
1Paul, Selected Studies in Federal Taxation (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1938),
Second series, p. 5.
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In the light thereof, it is desirable to attempt to indicate the extent
to which state law does affect federal income tax liability as well
as to indicate the confusion produced by the existence of the
varied state doctrines bearing on the point.2 Discussion of such
matters must, necessarily, take on an arbitrary pattern for, to a
large degree, it is impossible to trace any connected thread of
reason in the decisions or the departmental rulings.
I. TAXABLE ENTITIES
A. NATURAL PERSONS
Perhaps the first point at which a discussion might begin
would be with respect to the person affected by the income tax
law. So far as the "natural" taxpayer is concerned there is no
particular problem. Although differing provisions apply to citi-
zens and aliens, the federal statutes are uniform in application
and govern regardless of state boundaries for the statutes apply
to citizens or aliens in their relation to the United States and not
to any particular state.3 Differing tax provisions apply to resi-
dents and non-residents, 4 but again uniform rules are provided by
the Treasury Department for determining resident or non-resident
status.5. While judicial examination of the question of residence
or non-residence may involve a testing of state law, the determina-
tion is one upon the general rule intended by Congress rather than
the effect to be given to the rules of any particular state.e Resi-
dence or domicile in a particular state may have significance in
"choice-of-law" questions where state law is determinative of the
scope of liability, but such law has no application to the question
2 State law also affects other types of federal taxation, particularly estate, gift.
and stamp taxes, but problems arising in relation thereto have been purposely ex-
cluded.
3 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.11-3.
4 See particularly Int. Rev. Code § 116; 26 U. S. C. A. § 116.
5 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.211-2 to 29.211-5.
6 See Commissioner v. Swent, 155 F. (2d) 513 (1946) Commissioner v. Fiske's
Estate, 128 F. (2d) 487 (1942), cert. den. 317 U. S. 635, 63 S. Ct. 63. 87 L. Ed. 512
(1942). The latter case cites New York and Pennsylvania cases. The question of
residence was there said to be one of law, not fact; an important distinction in
determining whether the decision of the Tax Court is final as to the point.
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of whether a given individual falls within the classification of
resident, non-resident, citizen, or alien as designated by the
special statutory provisions of the income tax law.
B. ARTIFICIAL PERSONS
With respect to "artificial" persons or "legal" entities, the
question is entirely different. It has been observed that the
''most complex problems in the income tax law arise out of the
entity relationships of corporation-stockholder, partnership-part-
ner, and fiduciary-beneficiary. '" 7 No little of this complexity is
directly traceable to a confusion as to how far underlying state
law is to control for, with the exception of certain organizations
of very limited interest from the taxation standpoint,8 artificial or
legal entities must exist, if at all, under state law.
The name given to a particular type of organization formed
under state law is not determinative as the official regulations
provide:
For the purpose of taxation the Internal Revenue Code makes
its own classifications and prescribes its own standards of
classification. Local law is of no importance in this connec-
tion. Thus a trust may be classed as a trust or as an asso-
ciation (and therefore taxable as a corporation), depending
upon its nature or its activities . . .The term "partnership"
is not limited to the common law meaning of partnership, but
is broader in its scope and includes groups not commonly
called partnerships ... The term "corporation" is not limited
to the artificial entity usually knowvn as a corporation, but
includes also an association, a trust classed as an association
because of its nature or its activities, a joint-stock company,
an insurance company, and certain kinds of partnershipsY
The following instances will serve to illustrate the extent to which
local characterization has been disregarded in determining fed-
7 Rabkin and Johnson, Trust and Beneficiary Under the Income Tax, 1 Tax L.
Rev. 117 (1946).
8 For example, corporations organized under the China Trade Act of 1922, and
incorporated federal agencies.
9 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.3797-1.
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eral tax classification. In Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v.
Hopkins,'0 for example, an unincorporated joint stock association
organized under Texas law was technically a partnership, but
upon determination that it conducted its business in the general
manner of a corporation it was held to be subject to corporate
income taxes. The Supreme Court observed that while Congress
could not change a partnership into a corporation, it did not have
to accept the state classification when prescribing a scheme of
federal taxation. Again, in Morrissey v. Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue," the business enterprise was organized -n the form
of a trust with management and control vested in certain trustees.
It was, nevertheless, held to be taxable as an association, hence
subject to corporation taxes. The court there said that "while
the use of corporate forms may furnish persuasive evidence of the
existence of an association, the absence of particular forms, or of
the usual terminology of corporations, cannot be regarded as
decisive.' 1 2 In contrast, however, the grantor in A. A. Lewis &
Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,'13 desiring to sub-
divide and sell a tract of land, created a trust, named a trust
company as trustee, designated herself and another as bene-
ficiaries, and appointed the other person as the exclusive selling
agent and manager of the trust. The court found that there was
nothing more present than the common relationship of principal
and agent, coupled with the collateral incidents of an ordinary
trust, so the corporation tax was held not to apply.
1. Corporations
Particular types -of corporations may be subject to special tax
provisions or may be entirely exempt from tax. Insurance com-
panies, for example, are in the first of these categories.' 4  The
qualification of the particular organization under state insurance
10 269 U. S. 110, 46 S. Ct. 48, 70 L. Ed. 183 (1925).
11296 U. S. 344, 56 S. Ct. 289, 80 L. Ed. 263 (1935).
12 296 U. S. 344 at 358, 56 S. Ct. 289, 80 L. Ed. 263 at 271. For other instances
of taxation of business trusts as corporations, see Swanson v. Commissioner, 296
U. S. 362, 56 S. Ct. 283, 80 L. Ed. 273 (1935), and Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert
Associates, 296 U. S. 369, 56 S. Ct. 285, 80 L. Ed. 278 (1935).
is 301 U. S. 385, 57 S. Ct. 799, 81 L. Ed. 1174 (1937).
14 Int. Rev. Code §§ 201-7; 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 201-7.
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laws may be an important factor in arriving at a determination
whether these special provisions apply or not,15 but it is not neces-
sarily decisive. In Bowers v. Lawyers Mortgage Company,16 a
title guaranty company which invested in, bought and sold
securities, without guaranty, was regarded as engaging in a busi-
ness sufficiently lacking in insurance caliber to warrant excluding
it from the special insurance provisions even though its operations
were subject to state regulation. Banks may be similarly treated,
yet it has been held that the activities of an industrial loan asso-
ciation qualified it as a "bank," hence subject to special tax
provisions, even though the local law differentiated between banks
and loan associations.' 7
In some instances, the federal statutory provisions which
authorize exemption of certain corporations from tax import state
law either directly or by implication. Mutual savings banks, for
example, not having a capital stock represented by shares, are
entitled to exemption.' 8 According to Treasury Department regu-
lations, if the state law requires that the mutual savings bank be
incorporated or be under public supervision compliance with the
state law is essential before the exempt status is established. 19
In the absence of state provisions, however, the mutual savings
bank need be neither incorporated nor subject to supervision. 0
Domestic building and loan associations which confine substan-
tially all of their business to making loans to members are also
entitled to exemption from tax.2' The use of the word "domestic"
in the pertinent statutory provision has been taken, by the
Supreme Court, to mean that the tax law accepts, with qualifica-
15 United States v. Home Title Ins. Co., 289 U. S. 191, 52 S. Ct. 319, 76 L. Ed.
695 (1932).
16 285 U. S. 182, 52 S. Ct. 350, 76 L. Ed. 690 (1932). See also Dineen v. United
States, 153 F. (2d) 425 (1946), cert. den. 326 U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 1370, 90 L. Ed.
1262 (1946).
17 Staunton Industrial L. Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 F. (2d) 930 (1941).
18 Int. Rev. Code § 101(2) ; 26 U. S. C. A. § 101(2).
19 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.101(2)-1; I. T. 2207, IV-2 CB 75.
20A-C Inv. Ass'n v. Helvering, 68 F. (2d) 386 (1933); G. C. M. 13602, XIII-2
CB 62.
21 Int. Rev. Code § 101(4); 26 U. S. C. A. § 101(4).
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tions expressly stated in the law, "what the states are content to
recognize, unless there is a gross misuse of the name." 22
Cemetery corporations may likewise be exempt from tax,
depending on the existence of charter provisions and powers which
can only be determined under state law.23 To merit exemption,
the net earnings of such corporations must not inure to the
benefit of any stockholder or individual but, under regulations,
the existence of preferred stock entitling the holders thereof to
dividends at a fixed rate which does not exceed the legal rate of
interest in the state of incorporation or 8%, whichever is greater,
will not serve to disqualify so long as the articles of incorporation
contain provisions for the retirement of the preferred stock and
for the use of any remaining funds. 24 Farmers' co-operatives
having a similar capital structure may also benefit from tax
exemption. 25 In isolated cases, therefore, varying legal interest
rates in the different states may provide varying exemptions from
federal taxation.
The existence of other classes of exempt corporations under
state law is not, however, determinative in tax matters. A housing
corporation, for example, organized to provide homes for wage
earners at cost, has been allowed an exemption as a "civic
league," although it was denied an exemption under the domestic
building and loan provision because it was not chartered as such
under state law. 26 In much the same way, a club which was organ-
ized as a non-profit organization under state law, and had pre-
viously been held to be exempt from state income taxes under an
exemption provision identical to that in the federal law, was held
to be exempt from federal taxation but only after independent
analysis of its activities. 2 7 It might also be noted that religious,
charitable, and similar organizations are not automatically ex-
22 United States v. Cambridge Loan & Bldg. Co., 278 U. S. 55 at 59, 49 S. Ct. 39,
73 L. Ed. 180 at 182 (1928).
23 Int. Rev. Code §101(5) ; 26 U. S. C. A. §101(5).
24 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.101(5)-1.
25 Int. Rev. Code § 101(12); 26 U. S. C. A. § 101(12). Crop financing corpora-
tions are granted similar benefits under § 101(13).
26 Garden Homes Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F. (2d) 593 (1933).
27 Coeur D'Alene Country Club v. Viley, 64 F. Supp. 540 (1946). Appeal dis-
missed on appellant's motion.
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empt for the courts have held that charter powers alone are not
determinative. Thus, in Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,25 an operating corporation designed to provide
income for a charitable organization and which did turn over all
of its income to the latter was held to be entitled to exemption
although its charter contained powers so broad that tax liability
would have clearly followed had such powers been exercised. In
so holding, the court repudiated the argument that the word
"organized," used in the phrase permitting the exemption, 29
meant the same as "incorporated" and it thereby eliminated state
provisions from consideration. 0
Another question is apt to arise when the government or the
taxpayer seeks to disregard the separate entity of a corporation
for profit which has admittedly been regularly organized pursuant
to some general state corporation law. Prior to 1943, there were
numerous cases in which corporate identity was disregarded for
tax purposes. For example, in Heringer Brothers &, Sons v.
United States,31 a corporation which held record title to farm land
and engaged in no other business, having no employees, no cus-
tomary books of account, not holding directors' meetings nor
paying salaries or dividends, was held not to be a taxable entity.
In that year, however, the Supreme Court, through its decision in
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,32
disapproved by inference all prior lower court decisions which
had declared mere title-holding or holding companies to be im-
mune from federal corporation taxes. It there stated the rule to
be that whether the purpose was to gain an advantage under the
law of the state of incorporation, or to avoid or comply with the
demands of creditors, or to serve the creator's personal or
undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose was the equiva-
28 96 F. (2d) 776 (1938). See also N.P.E.F. Corp., TC mem. op., 5 TCM -, CCIH
Dec. 15,146(M) (1946).
29 Int. Rev. Code § 101(6); 26 U. S. C. A. § 101(6).
30 Sun-Herald Corporation v. Duggan, 73 F. (2d) 298 (1934), cert. den. 294 U. S.
719, 55 S. Ct. 546, 79 L. Ed. 1251 (1935). The Commissioner, however, apparently
refuses to follow the decision in Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F. (2d)
776 (1938). See G. C. M. 23063, 1942-1 CB 103.
31 53 F. Supp. 716 (1943), appeal dismissed pursuant to stipulation.
32 319 U. S. 436, 63 S. Ct. 1132, 87 L. Ed. 1499 (1943).
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lent of business activity or was followed by the carrying on of
business by the corporation, the corporation was to remain a
separate taxable entity. It did not, however, reject the exception
to the rule that corporate entity may be disregarded in cases
where the adoption of the corporate form is a sham device.
Since that determination, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
has upheld the right of a taxpayer to disregard, for tax purposes,
the existence of a corporation formed to hold title to real estate
which served no purpose in connection with the property and was
intended only as a blind to deter creditors. Another corporation
organized under the same circumstances but with the added factor
that it had floated a loan and had given as part security the rights
to two leases on property held by it, was held to be subject to cor-
poration taxes.3 3  In another case, that of Halprin v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue,34 the corporation was organized solely
for the purpose of taking title to property acquired at a fore-
closure sale. Immediately after acquisition of title it deeded the
property back to the stockholder, but the fact that permanent
financing arrangements had been made in the name of the corpo-
ration was regarded as sufficient business activitity to make the
corporation a separate taxable entity so as to warrant disallowing
to the stockholder alleged losses on rental operations arising after
the execution but before the recording of the deed. In the present
state of these authorities, it is difficult to enunciate any uniform
rule,35 other than to say that the effect given to the corporate
entity by the state of its creation is not the controlling factor
when the question is whether a separate taxable entity has been
created.
While corporations whose organization is defective under
state law may be treated as associations and thereby be subjected
to corporation taxes, 6 the fact that a corporate charter has been
33 Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F. (2d) 334 (1945).
34154 F. (2d) 112 (1946), affirming 4 TCM 789, CCH Dec. 14,692(M) (1945).
35 See Cleary, The Corporate Entity in Tax Cases, 1 Tax L. Rev. 3 (1945).
36 Brown Coal & Coke Co., 14 BTA 609, CCH Dec. 4645 (1928), acquiescence
noted; S. M. 972, 1 CB 233. See also Soeder v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 236
(1944), where conviction for felonious counsel and advice in the preparation of a
false and fraudulent corporation return was upheld despite failure to prove the
legal existence of the corporation under Ohio law, where the business was con-
ducted as a corporate business.
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issued does not require taxation as a corporation if the charter
has never been used and the business is continuously operated as
a partnership. 7  So, too, where a corporation has no existence,
either de jure or de facto, under state law until its charter is filed
with the Secretary of State, the first taxable accounting period as
a corporation has been held not to begin until corporate existence
under state law is recognized. 3s Similarly, the holding period of
corporate assets, for purpose of computing invested capital under
prior law, has been held to depend upon the state measure of cor-
porate existence since until then it could not hold property nor
could anyone else do so in such a way as to make the acquisition
or ownership by the corporation antedate its existence.8 9
Termination of corporate existence is a matter for state law,
but if the enterprise is continued in corporate form the organiza-
tion will be taxable as an association, hence will continue to be
subject to federal corporate income tax rates.40 The tax results
arising from the reinstatement of a corporate charter which has
been forfeited for non-payment of state license taxes, however,
may be affected by state law. If the forfeiture operated to dis-
solve the corporation, so that reinstatement requires the creation
of a new corporation, the latter is not required to file returns for
the period while the charter was forfeited and the directors held
title to the assets. 41 In direct contrast, if the state law provides
that upon reinstatement the charter should stand as if no forfei-
ture had occurred, the corporation is considered, for federal tax
37 United States v. Jelenko, 23 F. (2d) 511 (1927); Central Auto Market, 7
BTA 973, CCH Dec. 2686 (1927), acq. noted; Bentley, 5 BTA 314, CCH Dec. 1871
(1926), acq. noted; O.D. 1078, 5 CB 232.
as Jupiter Oil Co., BTA mem. op., CCH Dec. 10,947-C (1939).
39Younker Bros. Inc., 8 BTA 333, CCH Dec. 2850 (1927). See also Hub Shoe
Co., 2 BTA 836, CCH Dec. 834 (1925), acq. noted.
40 Coast Carton Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F. (2d) 739 (1945); 0. D. 365, 2 CE
222. Under an earlier Tax Board ruling, however, it was held that, on expiration
of the time limit for revival of a charter which expired by operation of law, the
stockholders received a constructive liquidating dividend as of the date the charter
expired. At that time, the corporation ceased to exist and continuance of the
business in corporate form was immaterial: Joel, 9 BTA 1027, CCH Dec. 3274
(1928). In Hub Shoe Co., 2 BTA 836, CCH Dec. 834 (1925), acq. noted, it was
held that a corporation which was continued as a partnership upon expiration of
the charter by limitation was not taxable as a corporation where it had neither
de jure nor de facto existence under state law.
41 I. T. 2260, V-1 CB 96.
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purposes, as having been in existence throughout the whole period
of forfeiture and is taxable accordingly. 42
Strict compliance with state laws respecting legal dissolution
of a corporation is not, generally speaking, required for federal
tax purposes. Thus it has been held that where the assets and
liabilities of the corporation were transferred to a partnership
bearing the same name and all steps necessary to dissolution were
taken prior to December 31st, the fact that a formal certificate of
dissolution was not issued until in September of the following
year did not require that the income of the partnership up to the
time of formal dissolution be taxed to the corporation. 43  The
Board of Tax Appeals there regarded it as particularly significant
that the corporation had no assets, conducted no business and re-
ceived no income after December 31st although it was, technically,
still alive. But dissolution prior to the return date does not avoid
tax liability,44 any more than does dissolution prior to the enact-
ment of a retroactive taxing act.45
After dissolution has actually occurred, the right to sue for a
refund of taxes, as by directors claiming as trustees of creditors
and stockholders, will depend on state law.40  The right of a suc-
cessor corporation to prosecute an appeal from a deficiency notice
42 Suburban Investment Co., 1 BTA 1121, CCH Dec. 435 (1925), acq. noted.
43W. R. Ross, 43 BTA 1155, CCH Dec. 11,732 (1941), acq. noted. See also South-
western Investment Co., 19 BTA 30, CCH Dec. 5864 (1944). U. S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.52-1, may be summarized about as follows: A corporation having an existence
during any portion of a taxable year Is required to make a return. If a corporation
was not in existence throughout an annual accounting period (either calendar year
or fiscal year), the corporation is not required to make a return for that fractional
part of a year during which it was not in existence. A corporation is not in exist-
ence after it ceases business and dissolves, retaining no assets, whether or not
under state law it may thereafter be treated as continuing as a corporation for
certain limited purposes connected with winding up its affairs, such as for the pur-
pose of suing and being sued. If the corporation has valuable claims for which It
will bring suit during this period, it has retained assets and it continues in
existence. A corporation does not go out of existence if it is merely turned over to
receivers or trustees who continue to operate it. A corporation which has received
a charter, but which has never perfected its organization, transacted no business,
nor received income from any source may, upon presentation of the facts to the
collector, be relieved from the necessity of making a return as long as it remains
in an unorganized condition. In the absence of a proper showing to the collector,
such a corporation will be required to make a return.
44 United States v. General Inspection & Loading Co., 192 F. 223 (1911).
45 United States v. Armstrong, 26 F. (2d) 227 (1928) ; Updike v. United States,
8 F. (2d) 913 (1925) ; United States v. McHatton, 2G6 F. 602 (1920).
46 Oklahoma Contracting Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 770 (1946).
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addressed to its predecessor will also turn on state law, to which
reference must be made to determine whether the successor was
formed by consolidation or merger.47 State law also governs the
right of a successor corporation or the directors of a corporation
in process of dissolution to execute binding waivers. 48 One other
instance might also be cited to show that state law is important.
Gain or loss, from the federal tax standpoint, will not be recog-
nized in the case of a "reorganization," which is defined to be a
"statutory merger or consolidation." 49 As the federal law refers
to a merger or consolidation effected in pursuance of the corpora-
tion laws of the United States, of a State or Territory, or of the
District of Columbia, 50 state law will strictly govern all such
reorganization problems. 51
2. Trusts
It has already been pointed out that business trusts may be
taxed on the same basis as corporations if they possess the char-
acteristics hereinbefore specified. Use of the term "trust" in the
special trust provisions to be found in the federal tax law is, there-
fore, intended to refer to an ordinary trust such as might be
created by will or by declaration under which a trustee or trustees
take title to property for the purpose of protecting or conserving
it "as is customarily required under the ordinary rules applied
in chancery and probate courts." 52  Whether a trust or a mere
agency relationship has been created, however, will be determined
47 Alaska Salmon Co. (Northern Fisheries, Inc.), 39 BTA 455. CCH Dec. 10,601
(1939) ; Skaneateles Paper Co., 29 BTA 150, CCH Dec. 8256 (1933) ; Trahern Pump
Co., 27 BTA 363, CCH Dec. 7865 (1932), holding that an Illinois "consolidation"
permits of prosecution of appeal in the name of either the successor or predecessor
corporation; Bowman Hotel Corp., 24 BTA 1193, CCH Dec. 7341 (1931), appeal dis.
by consent; Gideon-Anderson Co., 18 BTA 329, CCH Dec. 5652 (1929), appeal dis.
by consent in 45 F. (2d) 1011 (1930) ; Tide Water Oil Co., BTA mem. op., CCH
Dec. 11,711-A (1-944) ; International Mining Corp., BTA mem. op., CCH Dec.
11,701-C (1944) ; Falstaff Brewing Corp., BTA mem. op., CCH Dec. 10,794J (1944).
48 Helvering v. Newport Co., 291 U. S. 485, 54 S. Ct. 480, 78 L. Ed. 929 (1934) ;
Commissioner v. Oswego Falls Corp., 71 F. (2d) 673 (1934) ; McPherson v. Com-
missioner, 54 F. (2d) 751 (1932).
49 Int. Rev. Code § 112(g) ; 26 U. S. C. A. § 112(g).
So U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 112(g) (2).
51 Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 306 U. S. 522, 59 S. Ct. 634, 83 L. Ed.
957 (1939).
52 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.3793-3.
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by reference to the law of the state of creation.53  If state law
requires certain essential elements such as the existence of a
corpus,54 beneficiaries,5 5 a trustee who qualifies,50 or compliance
with the rule against perpetuities, 57 and these are lacking, there is
no trust. In much the same way, the validity of an oral trust will
depend on state law.58
Even though a valid trust exists, it does not follow that the
trustee thereof is necessarily to be regarded as the taxpayer, for
in the case of a revocable trust or where the title has become
vested in one who has no substantial adverse interest to the
settlor, the income is taxable to the settlor5 9 Whether the settlor
has or has not remained, in substance, the owner of the trust
property has been said not to depend on "the niceties of the par-
ticular conveyancing device used nor on the technical description
which the law of property gives to the estate or interest trans-
ferred to the trustees or beneficiaries of the trust," 60 but whether
the trust is or is not revocable by its terms does depend on appli-
cable state law.01 Retention by the settlor of an interest in the
income arising from the trust by which he is, or may at some time
be, enabled to receive the benefits therefrom is enough to require
that the income, otherwise taxable to the trustee, be taxed to the
settlor.. 2 In such a case, gains from the sale of securities have
been taxed to the settlor without regard to whether or not state
law would treat the gain as an addition to corpus.03
53 Rathborne v. Commissioner, 103 F. (2d) 301 (1939), affirming 37 BTA 607,
CCH Dec. 991 (1938) ; Berolzheimer, 40 BTA 645, CCH Dec. 10,828 (1939), nonacq.
noted.
54 Pension Trust Ruling No. 55, 464 CCH 6089.
55 Morsman v. Commissioner, 90 F. (2d) 18 (1937), cert. den. 302 U. S. 701, 58 S.
Ct. 20, 82 L. Ed. 542 (1937).
56 Standish, 4 TC 995, CCH Dec. 14,450 (1945), affirmed on stipulation in 154 F.
(2d) 1022 (1946).
57 Chamberlain, 19 BTA 126, CCH Dec. 5878 (1930), nonacq. noted.
58 Gaylord v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 408 (1946); Dye, BTA mem. op., CCHI
Dec. 12,864-C (1942).
59 Int. Rev. Code § 166; 26 U. S. C. A. § 166.
60 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 166-1.
61 Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 63 S. Ct. 140, 87 L. Ed. 154 (1942) ; Gaylord
v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 408 (1946) ; Lowenstein, 3 TC 1133, CCII Dec. 14,040
(1944), acq. noted.
62 Int. Rev. Code § 167; 26 U. S. C. A. § 167.
63 Greenough v. Commissioner, 74 F. (2d) 25 (1934).
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Perhaps the most important development concerning the tax-
able status of a trust is to be found in the Supreme Court decision
in Helvering v. Clifford. 4 It was there held that, independently
of the provisions taxing the settlor on income arising from a
revocable trust or from one under which the trust income could
be used for his benefit, the settlor could be taxed on the trust
income under the general taxing section if he retained sufficient
control to constitute him the "owner" of the corpus even though
not holding the strict legal title thereto. Within five years of that
holding, two hundred separate decisions were required to explain,
interpret and apply the rule there announced so that the Treasury
Department was finally forced to adopt specific regulations in-
tended to cover the situation found therein. 6 Despite a purported
disavowal of state law in determining the taxability of the settlor
under situations falling within the Clifford case, state law has
necessarily been applied to particular situations. The question of
whether trust income could have been used for the support of the
settlor's children, for example, important in determining whether
the settlor retained the "bundle of rights" necessary to tax him
on the trust income, has been answered by reference to state law. 7
Until a general body of federal law on the subject has been devel-
oped, then, it will be impossible to rule out the effect of state law
upon the taxability of trusts even though there has been a Her-
culean effort to establish national uniformity.
Once it has been established that the trust is to be treated as
a separate taxable entity, deduction is generally allowed to the
trustee for amounts currently distributed to the beneficiaries. In
that regard, local law controls as to whether particular items of
receipt are to be added to corpus or are to be distributed,68 thereby
64 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 788 (1940).
65 Int. Rev. Code § 22(a); 26 U. S. C. A. § 22(a).
66 T. D. 5488, 1946-1 CB 19. Amendments to the regulation have been proposed.
12 F. R. 560 (Jan. 28, 1947), so the law must still be regarded as unsettled.
67 Cushman v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 510 (1946) ; Gaylord v. Commissioner,
153 F. (2d) 408 (1946).
68 Johnston v. Helvering, 141 F. (2d) 208 (1944), cert. den. 323 U. S. 715, 65 S.
Ct. 41, 89 L. Ed. 575 (1944). See also Commissioner v. Pearson, 154 F. (2d) 256
(1946): Commissioner v. Gutman, 143 F. (2d) 201 (1944); DeBrabant v. Commis-
sioner, 90 F. (2d) 433 (1937) ; Thornton, 5 TC 1177, CCH Dec. 14,871 (1946), acq.
noted.
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operating to determinine responsibility for payment of the tax. It
has even been held, in that respect, that state court decisions on the
subject are binding on the Commissioner even though he was not a
party to the proceedings.6 9
3. Partnerships
Some special tax problems with respect to the partnership
form of enterprise need to be noticed. The statutory definition of
a "partnership" is short and reads as follows: "The term 'part-
nership' includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other
unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which
is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or corpo-
ration. "70 The organizations mentioned are not treated as tax-
able entities but the members thereof are taxed individually on
their pro-rata shares of the net income, whether distributed or
not,71 even though the "entity" theory of partnership is accepted
under local law. Where limited partnerships are concerned, how-
ever, tax liability as a corporation may be incurred if the organiza-
tion is not interrupted by the death of a general partner or by a
change in the ownership of his participating interest and the man-
agement is centralized in one or more persons acting in a repre-
sentative capacity.7 2  Whether these characteristics exist in a
particular organization is to be determined by examination of the
pertinent state statutes under which the limited partnership is
organized, 78 but the nature of the ordinary business or profes-
sional partnership is not usually challenged by the Treasury
Department.
The impact of high war-time corporate and personal income
69 Eisenmenger v. Commissioner, 145 F. (2d) 103 (1944). Reformation of a trust
instrument does not, however, affect tax liability for years prior to reformation:
Sinopoulo v. Jones, 154 F. (2d) 648 (1946).
70 Int. Rev. Code § 3797(a) (2) ; 26 U. S. C. A:. § 3797(a) (2).
71 Ibid., §§ 181-2.
72 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.3797-5.
73 Glensder Textile Co., 46 BTA 176, CCH Dec. 12,249 (1942), acq. noted; Taywal,
Ltd.. BTA mem. op., CCHI Dec. 12,592-G (1942) ; 0. D. 444, 2 CB 11; 0. D. 599.
3 CB 15; 0. D. 800, 4 CB 13; I. T. 2904, XIV-2 CB 151; G. C. M. 2467, VII-2 CB
188.
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taxes, however, has presented a new tax problem springing from
the development of "family" partnership agreements, often en-
tered into for the purpose of taking over closely-held corporations
or sole proprietorships, which agreements purport to make the
wife of or minor children of the original owner partners with him
in the enterprise so as to gain the benefit of lower tax rates by
dividing the net income among several people. Thousands of these
family partnerships have been challenged by the Treasury Depart-
ment and, in the cases of Comnvissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Tower7 4 and Lusthaus v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,7 it
was finally held that where the wife or child contributed neither
capital nor services to the enterprise no real partnership had been
formed even though the organization was valid under state law.
In the first of these cases, the court said:
When the existence of an alleged partnership arrangement is
challenged by outsiders, the question arises whether the part-
ners really and truly intended to join together for the purpose
of carrying on business and sharing in the profits and losses
or both. And their intention in this respect is a question of
fact, to be determined from testimony disclosed by their
"agreement, considered as a whole, and by their conduct in
execution of its provisions." . . . We see no reason why this
general rule should not apply in tax cases where the govern-
ment challenges the existence of a partnership for tax pur-
poses . . . But the Tax Court in making a final authoritative
finding on the question whether this was a real partnership is
not governed by how Michigan law might treat the same cir-
cumstances for purposes of state law. Thus, Michigan could
and might decide that the stock-transfer here was sufficient
under the state law to pass title to the wife, so that in the
event of her death it would pass to whatever members of her
family would be entitled to receive it under Michigan's law
of descent and distribution. But Michigan cannot by its deci-
sions and laws governing questions over which it has final say,
also decide issues of federal tax law and thus hamper the
74326 U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 532, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 559 (1946).
75326 U. S.-, 66 S. Ct. 539, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 567 (1946).
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effective enforcement of a valid federal tax levied against
earned income .. .The statutes of Congress designed to tax
income actually earned because of the capital and efforts of
each individual member of a joint enterprise are not to be
frustrated by state laws which for state purposes prescribe
the relations of the members to each other and to outsiders.
76
It would seem that the court is, in reality, using the same "con-
trol" test that was applied, through Helvering v. Clifford7 7 to the
family trust situations. If so, it rules out any question of strict
legal title under state law. The court did note, however, that the
"legal ownership of the capital purportedly contributed by a wife
will frequently throw light on the broader question of whether an
alleged partnership is real or pretended."78  This disregard of
state law and local determination as to legal title has been carried
to its logical conclusion for a partnership has been found to exist
for federal tax purposes even though a state statute prohibited the
creation of a partnership between a husband and his wife. 79
Termination of a partnership is important, from the tax stand-
point, for upon termination the income of the partnership up to
that date is to be included in the individual income tax returns of
the partners.8 0 The date of termination will also be important in
76 326 U. S. - at-, 66 S. Ct. 532 at 535-6, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 559 at 563-4.
77 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 788 (1940).
7s 326 U. S. - at -, 66 S. Ct. 532 at 537, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 559 at 565.
79 Willis B. Anderson, 6 TC 956, CCH Dec. 15,133 (1946) ; Francis A. Parker, 6
TC 974, CCH Dec. 15,135 (1946). In Claire L. Canfield, 7 TC 135, CCH Dec. 15,225
(1946), the Tax Court could not find that the husband and wife intended to create
a bona fide partnership but, since the wife had contributed to the capital, income
was allocated, on the basis of capital contributions, as a "business arrangement."
In an earlier decision, the Board of Tax Appeals had held that although a husband
and wife partnership was invalid under the laws of Michigan it would be given
effect for federal tax purposes as a joint enterprise: Wing, 17 BTA 1028, CCH
Dec. 5528 (1929), acq. noted. An illegal partnership may be recognized, according
to E. C. Ellery, 4 TC 407, CCH Dec. 14,255 (1945), acq. noted, where the husband
gave one-half of his gambling machine business to his wife, conditioned on the
formation of a partnership. The Tax Court held that the partnership, void because
of illegality under the state law, would not be recognized for tax purposes any more
than it is otherwise recognized by courts, except where there is no other feasible
solution. Such a partnership would be denied recognition now, under the ruling in
the Tower case, regardless of the illegal feature. In a subsequent decision, how-
ever, the Tax Court held that a partnership would be given tax recognition even
though it was informal because engaged in illegal gambling: Shaffer, TC mem. op.,
4 TCM 830, CCH Dec. 14,728(M) (1945).
so U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.182-1.
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determining the holding period of the individual partnership inter-
ests, fixing whether the resulting gain or loss from the disposition
of a partnership interest is a long or short term capital item. The
cases are not uniform, but the tendency seems to be for the courts
to follow state law in determining whether a partnership, ad-
mittedly effective for tax purposes, has been dissolved or ter-
minated. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
Henderson's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,1 appar-
ently holds that state law is determinative. In that case, a hus-
band was a member of a partnership and his partnership interest
was a community asset of the husband and wife according to
Louisiana law. Upon the death of the husband, the Commissioner
contended that the husband's share of the partnership income
accruing to the date of death should have been taxed on the basis
of one-half to his estate and one-half to his widow. After the
death of the husband, the partnership apparently operated at a
loss so that the income for the full year was less than for the
period up to the date of death. The partnership articles provided
that the firm should continue for one year after the death of any
partner. The court, holding that a separate determination of in-
come to the date of death was not required, said:
The Tax Court held that the partnership terminated with
death and a new partnership came into being; that the articles
were equivalent to an agreement that the business of the
partnership should be carried on for one year after the death
of any partner. This interpretation does violence to the
words used by the parties within the purview of the statute.
Article 2880 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that:
"Every partnership ends of right by the death of one of the
partners, unless an agreement has been made to the con-
trary." The implication is irresistible that the partnership
does not end of right by death if an agreement has been made
to the contrary. . ..
The Government contends that a partnership, even by
agreement, cannot be the same firm as it was before one of the
partners died "unless the firm operates with a dead man as a
81 155 F. (2d) 310 (1946).
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partner." We think it can, in legal contemplation, if the
statute authorizes it. Since a corporation may be given con-
tinuity of existence that is unaffected by death, we see no
reason why the State of Louisiana may not provide that a
partnership does not end of right by the death of one of the
partners. That the same firm continues is a legal fiction, but
such a thing is not new in the history of our jurisprudence . 2
Three Tax Court decisions rendered during 1946 also seem to
point to a conclusion that state law serves to determine the date
of dissolution or termination of a partnership. In the case of
Mary D. Walsh, 3 a Texas partnership was held not to have been
"terminated" by the death of a partner, even though the same
was admittedly "dissolved," for the Tax Court distinguished be-
tween termination and dissolution on the basis of the Texas part-
nership law, holding that, insofar as the surviving partners were
concerned, the death of a partner did not cut short the "taxable
year" of the partnership. In the case of Robert E. Ford, 4 it
determined, on the basis of the Minnesota version of the Uniform
Partnership Act, that certain partnership assets, sold three years
after two of the original partners had bought out the interest of
the third partner, still retained the original cost basis to the part-
nership. Had the purchase of the third partner's interest been
treated as terminating the partnership, the cost basis would have
reflected the increase in value of the interest of the third partner.
The Tax Court noted that the Uniform Partnership Act specifi-
cally provided that a transfer of interest did not, ipso facto, dis-
solve the partnership.85 In the third case, that of Allan S. Leh-
man, 6 the court was obliged to pass upon the effect to be given
to the death of a partner and of changes of membership in a part-
nership organized under New York law. Admitting that the death
of the partner dissolved the partnership, the court nevertheless
held that neither the death of the partner nor the transfer of
82 155 F. (2d) 310 at 313.
83 7 TC 205, CCH Dec. 15,237 (1946).
84 6 TC 499, CCH Dec. 15,034 (1946).
85 Uniform Partnership Act, § 27, 7 U. L. A. 41.
8 7 TC -, CCH Dec. 15,457 (1946).
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interests between partners or the admission of new partners
worked such a change in the partnership as to cause a change in
the holding period of the partner's interests where the articles of
partnership provided for continuation of the business.
8 7
4. Family Entities
The tax effect of family relationships, at least in connection
with trusts and partnerships, has already been discussed and it
has been noted that the federal income tax law, to a large degree,
disregards legal title as fixed by state law in determining just who
is to be taxed upon the income received. It has been seen that
the test is rather one of management and control of the income-
producing property; an economic, instead of a legal concept. In
direct contrast, an entirely different approach has been followed
up to now in determining the tax effects of the community prop-
erty form of ownership or of the variant types of common-law
joint ownership permitted between husband and wife.
Found in eight western and southern states, 8 the community
property system of ownership antedates the present income tax
law. - Its distinguishing characteristic lies in the co-ownership by
husband and wife of all property acquired after marriage through
their productive efforts, but the particularized application of the
community property laws in the eight "traditional" community
property states differs widely in many important respects. Ques-
tions as to the extent to which community income may be made
separate income, and vice versa, by contract between the spouses;
the effect of the system on property brought from a common-law
87 A dissenting opinion to the Lehman decision points out, however, that the rul-
Ing in the Robert E. Ford case, 6 TC 499, CCH Dec. 15,034 (1946), was not author-
ity for it was decided under a different state law. It also noted that the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Darcy v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 66 F. (2d) 581 (1933), cert. den. 290 U. S. 705, 54 S. Ct. 372, 78 L. Ed.
606 (1934), had specifically considered the pertinent section of the New York law
in a case holding that decedent's share of partnership profits to the date of his
death was to be included in his return and had there decided that the parties could
not, by contract, prolong the life of the partnership after the death of one of the
partners.
88 Arizona, California. Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Wash-
ington. In California, Nevada and Texas, the system is incorporated into the state
constitutions. As found in Louisiana, it is of French origin; in the others, its
antecedents rest upon Spanish law.
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state to a community-property state; the classification of prop-
erty purchased on individual or joint credit; and many similar
questions will provoke different answers depending on the particu-
lar state law which is to be applied. In a very real sense, then,
there is no general community property law but instead eight
community property laws.
At the outset, the Treasury Department recognized the divi-
sion of income pursuant to community property laws as a distinct
and separate basis for taxation. With the advent of decisions
which seemed to hold that the person who controlled and managed
the income should be taxed on it regardless of technical title under
state law, 9 cases were instituted to test the tax effect of the com-
munity property laws in four of these states. The result was the
decision in Poe v. Seaborn9° which based the federal tax conse-
quences strictly on legal title under state law, disregarding any
"control" theory. The Supreme Court there indicated that when
Congress imposed the tax on the "income of every individual" 9 1
it meant income "owned" by the individual, i.e. owned as deter-
mined by reference to state law. Subsequent thereto, in United
States v. Malcolm, 92 the court passed upon the effect to be given to
certain California legislation enacted in 1927 which made the
wife's community interest a present, vested one, rather than a
mere expectancy in survivorship. It held such legislation was
effective to split community income between husband and wife.
There the question rested, with the federal courts called upon to
determine hundreds of questions as to the effect of the eight com-
munity property laws on federal tax liability.
Unsuccessful attempts were made in 1934, in 1937, and again
in 1941 to secure legislation for compulsory joint returns by hus-
89 United States v. Robbins, 269 U. S. 315, 46 S. Ct. 148, 70 L. Ed. 285 (1926),
where the wife had an "expectancy" only under California law as it stood prior to
1927; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 241, 74 L. Ed. 731 (1930), treating an
agreement for the division of income between husband and wife as being ineffective;
and Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 50 S. Ct. 336, 74 L. Ed. 916 (1930), to the
effect that a settlor was to be taxed on the income from a revocable trust.
90282 U. S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58, 75 L. Ed. 239 (1930).
91 This phrase appears in Int. Rev. Code § 22(a), the same section that was relied
on in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 788 (1940).
92 282 U. S. 792, 51 S. Ct. 184, 75 L. Ed. 714 (1931).
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bands and wives which would have eliminated the federal tax
advantage arising from the existence of community income.93 In
the meantime, rising federal tax rates in the '30's put common-law
states bordering on community-property states at a distinct dis-
advantage. Oklahoma particularly was faced with the loss of
many of its wealthy inhabitants who found it economically advis-
able to move across the border into Texas to obtain the federal
tax benefits arising from community property. In 1939, it passed
an elective community property law. Oregon followed with one in
1943. The Treasury Department contested the effectiveness of the
Oklahoma law for federal tax purposes and, in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Harmon,94 was successful before the Supreme
Court which held that the Oklahoma system was not one dictated
by state policy as an incident to matrimony but was, rather, one
which granted legislative permission for voluntary action effecting
the transfer of rights of a husband and wife. At the next legis-
lative session, Oklahoma repealed its elective law and adopted a
new community property law without elective features.95 The new
statute provides generally that all property of the husband or
wife owned or claimed before marriage or the effective date of the
act, whichever is later, and all property acquired afterwards by
gift, devise, or descent, or as compensation for personal injuries,
remains separate property; but all other property acquired by
either spouse during marriage, after the effective date of the act,
is to be regarded as community property with each spouse having
a vested one-half interest therein.
The federal tax effect of the new Oklahoma statute has not
been tested for the Treasury Department has apparently decided
to attempt to achieve uniformity on a national scale through adop-
tion of the community property principle, rather than to fight
it. The Bureau of Internal Revenue has formally ruled that both
the Oklahoma law and a similar one adopted, in 1945, for the
93 That advantage stems from the federal system of graduated tax rates. The
tax on two incomes of $5000, for example, is less than the tax on one income of
$10,000.
94 323 U. S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103, 89 L. Ed. 60 (1944).
95 Okla. Laws 1945, p. 118, effective July 26, 1945. Oregon repealed its elective
community property law but has not, as yet, replaced it.
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Territory of Hawaii 0 are to be given effect so that husbands and
wives domiciled in Oklahoma or Hawaii may each include in their
separate federal income tax returns one-half of the community
income received after the effective dates of the respective stat-
utes.9 7 Treasury spokesmen have even gone so far as to recom-
mend that the federal law be changed to permit husbands and
wives in all states to combine their income, divide by two, and
pay a total tax computed on the basis of two separate incomes.98
Until the question is resolved either by forcing compulsory joint
returns or by permitting a nation-wide division of income, the
present high federal income tax rates may be expected to exert
pressure on other states to follow the Oklahoma and Hawaii prece-
dents and to adopt community property laws. 99
Just as in the case of community property, common law con-
cepts relating to joint ownership of property, whether such prop-
erty is held by a husband and wife or by others, are recognized for
federal income tax purposes. Thus a husband and wife, holding
property as joint tenants under a system of state law which incor-
porates the principle that each joint tenant is entitled to his or her
share of the rents or profits derived from the jointly-owned prop-
erty, may each report one-half of the net income arising from the
property." Similarly, when such property is sold, for purpose of
computing any gain or loss, the sale price is allocated among the
spouses equally, unless a sale of the jointly-owned property had
been arranged prior to the transaction creating the joint tenancy
thereby bringing the bona fides of joint ownership into question.2
96 Rev. Laws Hawaii, Ch. 301A, Tit. 32.
97 I. T. 3782, 46-1 CB 84, as to Oklahoma residents, and I. T. 3784, 46-1 CB 85,
as to those residing in Hawaii.
98 Speeches by Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., General Counsel of the Treasury 'Depart-
ment, at the convention of the State Bar of California, Coronado, Cal., Sept. 28,
1946, and by Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Legislative Counsel of the Treasury Depart-
ment, before the American Institute of Accountants, Atlantic City, N. J., Oct. 3,
1946.
99 Forty-four state legislatures meet in regular session during the current year.
It is understood that bills are ready for introduction, or under consideration, in
many of them.
1 Edmonds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 90 F. (2d) 14 (1937), cert. den.
302 U. S. 713, 58 S. Ct. 32, 82 L. Ed. 551 (1937) ; Tracy, 25 BTA 1055, CCH Dec.
7510 (Florida), acq. noted; Haynes, 7 BTA 465, CC Dec. 2569 (Michigan), acq.
noted; 1. T. 3754, 1945 CB 143 (Wisconsin).
2 MeInerney v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 82 F. (2d) 665 (1936) ; I. T.
3754, 1945 CB 143.
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Determination of the basis for computing gain or loss, as well as
depreciation, on jointly-owned property is also to be made pur-
suant to the state law under which the property right has been
created. In Illinois, for example, the cost basis to a surviving
spouse is the original total cost of the jointly-owned property; a
conclusion which has been reached on the theory that, as each
joint tenant is considered seized of the entire estate, the interest
of the deceased joint tenant does not pass to the survivor but
ceases at the moment of death. Deductible items connected with
jointly-owned property, such as taxes and mortgage interest, may
be claimed by either spouse filing a separate return, so long as
the other does not also claim the deduction, because, under appro-
priate state law, such items are the liabilities of either joint tenant
as well as of both.4
Where the strict common-law tenancy by the entirety still
exists, as in Massachusetts, the husband is entitled to the full use
of the estate and the income arising therefrom during the period
of the marital relationship so is taxable in full on the income from
any property so held.5 In other states, where modification of the
common-law estate has occurred, income from the property is
divisible equally between the spouses and taxable accordingly.6
Decisions and rulings of that character turn upon the fact that
local Married Women's Property Acts have so changed the nature
of the common-law tenancy by the entirety that the income accru-
ing from such property during continuance of the marital status
belongs to both spouses and not to either one exclusively. Just as
in the case of property held in joint tenancy, either husband or wife
3 G. C. M. 6677, VIII-2 CB 172 (1929). See also Helen G. Carpenter, 27 BTA 282,
CCH Dec. 7853, and I. T. 3785, 46-1 CB 98 (1946) (Minnesota).
4 1. T. 3785, 46-1 CB 98 (1946).
5 Cooley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 75 F. (2d) 188 (1935), cert. den.
295 U. S. 747, 55 S. Ct. 825, 79 L. Ed. 1692 (1935).
6 Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579, 61 S. Ct. 759, 85 L. Ed. 1055 (1941) ; Paul
G. Greene, I. T. 3796, 1946-1 CB 88 (D. C.) ; I. T. 3235, 1938-2 CB 160 (Florida);
Saulsbury, 27 BTA 744, CCH Dec. 7927, I. T. 1670, Ir-1 CB 146 (Maryland):
Gessner, 32 BTA 1258, CCH Dec. 9058, acq. noted; G. C. M. 19143, 1937-2 CB 223,
I. T. 1574, rI-1 CB 143 (Michigan); Upthegrove, 33 BTA 952. CCH Dec. 9209, I. T.
2381, VI-2 CB 118 (Missouri) ; I. T. 1555, Il- CB 142 (New York) ; I. T. 3743, 1945
CB 142 (Oregon) ; Brennan, 4 TC 1260, CCH Dec. 14,515; I. T. 3783, 1946 CB 84
(Pennsylvania). See also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hart, 76 F. (2d)
864 (1935).
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may take the deduction for interest, taxes, or the likeJand gains
and losses arising from the sale of the property are to be divided
between them equally.8
Subsequent to the determination reached in the Tower and
Lusthaus cases above mentioned, the Tax Court had occasion to
consider the tax effect of a conveyance to "A and B, husband and
wife," creating a tenancy by the entirety under applicable Michi-
gan law, where the husband alone furnished the consideration and
paid for improvements thereafter made. The property was leased
by the husband and wife, checks for the rent were payable to them
both, but the entire income was deposited by the husband to his
separate account. The Tax Court, nevertheless, held that, since
an actual tenancy by the entirety existed, it was immaterial, for
purpose of taxing the income equally to the husband and wife,
that the income was received by the husband alone.9 Such re-
liance on legal title in the strictest sense is indeed startling when
contrasted with the attitude taken in the partnership cases.
The general effect given to questions concerning tenancies by
the entirety has been accorded where the property is owned by
tenants in common. 10 But where the income arises from property
held in, or purchased from, a joint account so as to be in the nature
of a tenancy in common although not meeting technical state re-
quirements for such type of ownership, a husband and wife have
been held taxable in proportion to their ratable contributions to
the joint account, regardless of the record title."
It might be noted, then, that the impact of existing state law
on federal income taxation has probably reached its highest, and
certainly its most consistent, level with respect to the tax problems
of the family entity.
7G. C. M. 15530, XIV-2 CB 107 (1935).
8 I. T. 1574, I-1 CB 143. It is interesting to note that this rule is to be applied
even where strict common-law doctrines still prevail.
9 Paul G. Greene, 7 TC 142, CCH Dec. 15,226 (1946).
10 Hafner, 31 BTA 338, CCH Dec. 8731 (1934).
11 Dunham, 27 BTA 1068 CCII Dec. 7987 (1933), acq. noted; Bekins, 20 BTA 809,
CCII Dec. 6317 (1930) ; First National Bank of Duluth, 13 BTA 1096, CCH Dec.
4481 (1928), nonacq. noted.
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5. Miscellaneous Problems
Certain other situations involving questions as to who is to be
taxed disclose no more uniformity than that found in the cases
already examined. The validity of an assignment of income is
generally a question for state law. In a leading case on the sub-
ject, that of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Blair,12 a federal
court had determined that a trust created by an Illinois resident
was of spendthrift character so treated an assignment by the
beneficiary as being invalid. Thereafter, in other litigation,
the Illinois Appellate Court decided that the trust was
not a spendthrift one according to state law, 13 so the Supreme
Court of the United States subsequently held that this also served
to determine the tax question.14 The fact that the state decision
was rendered by an intermediate appellate tribunal was regarded
as being immaterial, and as the second federal case involved in-
come accruing in later years the first federal decision was held
not to be res judicata. The court, noting that the donor was a
resident of Illinois, said that "his disposition of his property in
that State was subject to its law. By that law the character of
the trust, the nature and extent of the interest of the beneficiary,
and the power of the beneficiary to assign that interest in whole
or in part, are to be determined."' 5  Local law is not effective,
however, to control the federal tax consequences of an assignment
of income to be earned 6 or of income represented by interest cou-
pons when taken apart from the ownership of the bonds them-
selves.' 7 In such situations, the federal courts have reasoned that
the assignor or donor has received an economic benefit from the
disposition of the income which is sufficient to support the tax.
260 F. (2d) 340 (1932), cert. den. 288 U. S. 602, 53 S. Ct. 386, 77 L. Ed. 977
(1933).
13 Blair v. Linn, 274 Ill. App. 23 (1934).
14 Blair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 300 U. S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 330, 81 L. Ed.
465 (1937). Conversely, a state court determination that the trust was of spend-
thrift character has been held to make the assignment void so as to leave the
beneficiary subject to taxation on the assigned income: St. Louis Union Trust Co.
v. United States, 143 F. (2d) 842 (1944).
15 300 U. S. 5 at 9-10, 57 S. Ct. 330, 81 L. Ed. 4(;5 at 469.
16 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U., S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 241, 74 L. Ed. 731 (1930).
17 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144, 85 L. Ed. 75 (1940).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Where a gift is recognized, though, state law governs the legal
requirements necessary to effectuate it as well as the time when it
becomes effective.' 8
Whether a contract for the sale of shares of stock is a condi-
tional one or not, important in answering the question as to who
is to be taxed for dividend payments made on such shares, has
been settled according to state law.19 But questions involving oil
and gas interests, on the other hand, have been decided with com-
plete disregard for state law. The right to depreciation or deple-
tion allowances has been said not to depend on the retention of a
legal interest but rather on a right to share in the oil or gas pro-
duced; an economic test instead of a legal one. 20  So, too, classifi-
cation of oil in place has been treated as being exclusively a fed-
eral question unaffected by its fugacious nature according to state
law. 2'
II. TAX COMPUTATION
The situations already discussed have been primarily con-
cerned with the question as to who was to be taxed. Equally
complex problems concerning the application of state law may
arise in respect to other points. If federal law prescribes the
treatment to be given these problems it is, of course, controlling.
Where federal law is not specific, however, there is an absence of
uniformity for while many cases are decided on the assumption
that there is no difference in the laws of the several states, other
cases seem to assume the existence of a federal common law.
18 Shelden, 25 BTA 5, CCH Dec. 7352 (1931).
19 DeGuire v. Higgins, 65 F. Supp. 445 (1946). But, for accrual of dividends,
where the stockholder died between date of declaration and date of payment, state
law does not control: Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 324 U. S. 393,
65 S. Ct. 811, 89 L. Ed. 1023 (1945).
20 Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., - U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 861,
90 L. Ed. (adv.) 801 (1946); Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev.,
326 U. S. 599, 66 S. Ct. 409, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 293 (1946) ; Palmer v. Bender, 287
U. S. 551, 53 S. Ct. 225, 77 L. Ed. 489 (1933); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103,
53 S. Ct. 74, 77 L. Ed. 199 (1932).
21 Fleming v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 153 P'. (2d) 361 (1946)
Boudreau v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 134 F. (2d) 360 (1943).
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A. THE "INCOME" CONCEPT
Conversions of capital from one form to another receive spe-
cial federal tax treatment distinct from that accorded to "ordi-
nary" income. A relatively early decision pointed out that whether
there was a gain from the sale or exchange of capital assets was
not to be controlled by any particular characterization, in state
law, of the payments made.22 Royalties from oil and gas leases,
for example, as well as bonuses received upon the execution of
such leases, were there held not to be subject to the capital gains
provisions, regardless of the state characterization of the leases
as present sales of oil and gas in place. The question was said
to be entirely different from that raised when the lessor was a
state instrumentality and the lessee was sought to be taxed. In
the latter situation, however, state law, it happened to be the same
state law in both cases, was examined to determine whether the
oil and gas had ceased to be the property of a state instrumental-
ity which was thought, at that time, to be constitutionally exempt
from taxation.23 Royalties from a mining lease have been treated
as ordinary income even though, under state law, the lease would
have been dealt with as a sale of mineral in place. 24 So, too, cash
received upon the execution of a 99-year lease renewable forever
has been classed as income and not a return of capital although,
under Ohio law, such leases are treated in many respects like
conveyances. 25
The taxable effect of payments of money, as to both payor and
payee, may be determined independently of state law. Whether
a specific item constitutes the payment of interest has been so
treated for the court, in Deputy v. duPont,26 said: "In the busi-
22 Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 53 S. Ct. 74, 77 L. Ed. 199 (1932).
23 Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279, 51 S. Ct. 432, 75 L. Ed. 1032
(1931). Such a determination would be unnecessary under Helvering v. Mountain
Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376, 58 S. Ct. 623, 82 L. Ed. 907 (1938).
24 Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 308, 53 S. Ct. 150, 77 L. Ed.
325 (1932).
25 Butler, 19 BTA 718, CCH Dec. 6003, acq. noted.
26 308 U. S. 488, 60 S. Ct. 363, 84 L. Ed. 416 (1940). See also Equitable Life A.
Soc. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 321 U. S. 560, 64 S. Ct. 722, 88 L. Ed. 927
(1944); Bond Auto Loan Corp. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 153 F. (2d) 50
(1946); Workingmen's Loan Ass'n v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 359 (1944);
Noteman v. Welch, 108 F. (2d) 206 (1939).
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ness world 'interest on indebtedness' means compensation for the
use or forbearance of money. In the absence of clear evidence to
the contrary, we assume that Congress has used these words in
that sense." 27 Distributions from corporate earnings may consti-
tute dividends notwithstanding the fact that the formalities of
declaration have not been observed, that the distribution is not
recorded on the corporate books as such, is not made proportion-
ately to stockholdings or even omits some stockholders from par-
ticipation in the benefit thereof.2 Again, in determining whether
certain expenses are business expenses so as to be deductible, state
law has been disregarded. 29 In order to ascertain whether inter-
est on bonds or other obligations of states, of their political sub-
divisions, is exempt from federal tax, recourse to the terms of the
state statute under which such obligations are issued has been
necessary,30 but a uniform federal rule has been applied when
the question has been as to whether or not money or property
received in compromise of a claim as an heir is exempt as a be-
quest.3 1 In general, accounting questions are dealt with according
to a uniform rule so that the word "paid," for example, is treated
as meaning a cash payment and not a payment by note, even
though the latter method be permitted under state law.32 So, too,
the fact that a reserve is required under state law is generally no
warrant for its deduction for federal tax purposes. 33
When the question is whether a debt has become worthless so
as to support a claim for loss, however, the matter has turned on
27 308 U. S. 488 at 498, 60 S. Ct. 363, 84 L. Ed. 416 at 424.
28 Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 153 F. (2d) 602
(1946).
29 Thomas Flexible Coupling Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., - F. (2d) -, 46-2
USTC 9347 (C. C. A. 3, 1946) ; Low v. Nunan, 154 F. (2d) 261 (1946) ; Eskimo
Pie Corp., 4 TC 669, CCH Dec. 14,348, affirmed per curiam in 153 F. (2d) 301
(1946).
30 See, for example, Commissioner of Internal Rev. v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.
(2d) 998 (1944) ; Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Harrison, 63 F. Supp. 495 (1945).
3l Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188, 59 S. Ct. 155, 83 L. Ed. 119 (1938).
32 Hart v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 54 F. (2d) 848 (1932).
33 Helvering v. Illinois L. Ins. Co., 299 U. S. 88, 57 S. Ct. 63, 81 L. Ed. 56 (1936)
City Title Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 152 F. (2d) 859 (1946).
However, federal tax law does expressly recognize that such reserves may be
required by state law in some instances. See Int. Rev. Code, § 101(12). where
exemption of farmers' co-operatives will not be denied where earnings are ac-
cumulated to meet state reserve requirements.
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state law. For example, it has been decided that the right of an
indemnitor to reach trust assets of the defaulting debtor would
have to be settled by state law.34  Much the same view has also
been followed with respect to foreclosures under state law in fix-
ing whether or not a debt has become bad, when the loss must be
taken, and precisely when a capital asset is acquired at fore-
closure saleA5
Whether or not money illegally acquired constitutes taxable
income also presents a question of no small difficulty. Earlier
decisions would seem to indicate that legal title to the money
involved was not the controlling point. For example, the receipt
of usurious interest has been held taxable although the taxpayer
might be allowed to establish a loss if the borrower reclaims the
interest paid.36 Income from gambling or other illegal enter-
prises, 37 including kidnaping, 38 has been treated as taxable to the
recipient even to the point where the expenses of the illegal busi-
ness have been allowed as deductible items.3 9 But the Supreme
Court selected, in Comvissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilcox, 40
what might be considered a strange case to re-assert the appli-
34Acheson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 155 F. (2d) 369 (1946).
35 Loss on foreclosure occurs when the period of redemption under state law ex-
pires, according to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hawkins, 91 F. (2d) 354
(1937). See also G. C. M. 19367, 1937-2 CB 115. Where there is no equity of
redemption, the foreelsoure sale, and not the decree preceding it, fixes the loss:
Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U. S. 504, 61 S. Ct. 368, 85 L. Ed. 303 (1941). Similarly,
the mortgagee's right to a had debt deduction will depend on state law. If, under
the state law, entry to foreclosure does not evidence complete or partial worth-
lessness, no deduction can be taken until expiration of the redemption period:
Hadley Falls Trust Co. v. United States, 110 F. (2d) 887 (1940). But where
property is bid in on foreclosure sale at less than the indebtedness and, under state
law, no deficiency judgment can be obtained, the bad debt deduction is allowable
to the extent that the cost basis for the mortgage exceeds the sale proceeds. In
addition, gain or loss to the mortgagee is realized in the year in which his ac-
quisition of the property becomes absolute and indefeasible: G. C. M. 19573, 1938-1
CB 214. Where the period of redemption has been extended by special state law,
a bad debt deduction will be denied until expiration of the extended period: Foley
v. Reynolds, 58 F. Supp. 228 (1944).
36 Barker v. Magruder, 95 F. (2d) 122 (1938).
37 United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259, 47 S. Ct. 607, 71 L. Ed. 1037 (1927);
National City Bank of New York v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 93 (1938).
38 Murray Humphreys, 42 BTA 857, CCH Dec. 11,326 (1940).
39 Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 407, 64 S. Ct. 249, 88 L.
Ed. 171 (1943) ; Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Longhorn Portland Cem. Co., 3 TC
310, CCH Dec. 13,747 (1944), reversed on other grounds in 148 F. (2d) 276 (1945),
cert. den. - U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 33, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 39 (1945).
40O- U. S. -, 66 S. Ct. 546, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 553 (1946).
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cability of legal title under state law in determining questions
concerning the taxability of illegal income. Wilcox, the taxpayer
in that case, had been employed as a book-keeper. When the
employer's books were audited, it was discovered that he had con-
verted over $12,000 of company funds in 1941, most of which he
had lost in gambling houses in Nevada. He was convicted by a
Nevada state court, in 1942, for the crime of embezzlement and
was sentenced to serve a term in prison from which he was
paroled in 1943. The employer never forgave nor condoned the
taking of the money and was still holding the employee respon-
sible to restore the same at the time of the Supreme Court de-
cision.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue had there determined
that the amount converted in 1941 was to be regarded as taxable
income to Wilcox in that year, predicating his holding on the
general taxing section of the Internal Revenue Code 41 which had
been found sufficient to justify taxing the settlor in the Clifford
case42 on the trust income. The Supreme Court disagreed and
said:
For present purposes, however, it is enough to note that a
taxable gain is conditioned upon (1) the presence of a claim
of right to the alleged gain and (2) the absence of a definite,
unconditional obligation to repay or return that which would
otherwise constitute a gain. Without some bona fide legal
or equitable claim, even though it be contingent or contested
in nature, the taxpayer cannot be said to have received any
gain or profit within the reach of Section 22(a). 43
The court noted that, under Nevada law, while the crime of em-
bezzlement was complete whenever an appropriation was made,
the employer was entitled to replevy the money as soon as it was
appropriated or to have it summarily restored by a magistrate.
As the employer at all times regarded the embezzler liable to
return the full amount appropriated and as the debtor-creditor
relationship was definite and unconditional, the court concluded
41Int. Rev. Code §22(a), 26 U. S. C. A. § 22(a).
42 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 788 (1940).
43 - U. S. - at -, 66 S. Ct. 546 at 549, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 553 at 555.
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that "all right, title and interest" in the money rested with the
employer. That being so, the taxpayer was said to have received
no taxable income from the embezzlement. Just how far the
doctrine of the Wilcox case is to be carried is, of course, a matter
of pure conjecture but it would seem as if money illegally ac-
quired is no longer to be treated as income to the recipient if
action might be maintained to compel the return thereof.
B. DEDUCTIONS FROM INCOME
The right to claim a deduction against income for money paid
for state taxes furnishes a striking example of the impact of state
law upon federal income tax liability. The Internal Revenue Code
permits the deduction of "taxes paid or accrued within the tax-
able year ' 44 except for most federal taxes, all estate, legacy,
inheritance, succession or gift taxes, and local benefit taxes. The
accompanying regulations indicate that, in general, such taxes are
deductible only by the person upon whom they are imposed.45
From the very beginning, determination as to who was the person
upon whom the deductible tax items were imposed has been made
by reference to state law. The question is, in reality, one of the
"legal incidence" of the state or local tax.4 6
For example, the Florida state gasoline tax was at one time
regarded as being imposed upon the consumer, so constituted a
deductible item to him.4 7  When the Florida Supreme Court de-
clared that the tax was legally imposed upon the manufacturer,
,wholesaler or dealer who made the first sale in the state, the
federal rule was modified accordingly."' In another instance, the
Nebraska gasoline tax was originally held to be. imposed upon the
dealer so as to bar deduction thereof by the ultimate consumer.4 9
4 4 Int. Rev. Code §23(c) ; 26 U. S. C. A. §23(c).
45 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(c)-1. Retail sales taxes, passed on and separately
stated, constitute a statutory exception.
46 For Tax Court determinations with regard to state sales taxes, see Eckstein,
41 BTA 746, CCH Dec. 11,048 (1940), as to Illinois retailer's occupation tax: L. &
C. Mayers Co., Inc., BTA mem. op., CCH Dec. 12,167-E (1941), for New York City
tax; Junius Adams, BTA mem. op., CCH Dec. 12,472-A (1942), and McDermott,
3 TC 929, CCH Dec. 13,951 (1944), for North Carolina.
47 I. T. 3113, 1937-2 CB 86.
48 I. T. 3636, 1944 CB 103.
49 G. C. M. 7498, IX-1 CB 102.
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In 1943, that state enacted legislation permitting consumers to
obtain refunds of tax paid on gasoline used for non-highway pur-
poses. The change in the law was considered sufficient evidence
of a shift in the legal incidence of the state tax so as to permit
its deduction by consumers thereafter." Whether or not a sales
tax is a "retail" tax within the purview of the statute5' is also
determined by local law.
Other vexing questions concerning the deduction of state and
local taxes may revolve around the accrual date. Taxpayers on
a cash basis, of course, may deduct such taxes only after actual
payment, but where the accrual basis is used, or as between vendor
and vendee, the deduction must be taken as of the time of accrual.
Such a determination is usually a federal question but reference
has been made to local law to determine the specific date to be
used. In that regard, state and local real property taxes and
state franchise taxes present the most difficulty.52
After calculation has been made of the amount of the net
income, a personal exemptionis granted to all natural taxpayers.
In the computation thereof, such things as marriage, divorce,
death, and adoption will have definite federal tax effects. Where
two individuals enjoy the status of husband and wife at the end
of the taxable year they may be eligible to file a joint return but
the same fact may also permit one spouse to take the entire per-
sonal exemption in a separate return if the other spouse has no
income. As the Internal Revenue Code uses the terms "hus-
band," "wife," "married," and "spouse" without special defi-
nition it would seem that such terms should bear their ordinary
connotation. There being no formal rulings or decisions directly
in point, it would seem that the answer to whether or not two per-
sons are in fact married must be settled by state law since creation
of the marital status is subject only to state regulation. Dissolu-
tion of the marital status by a decree of absolute divorce, effective
under state law for that purpose, would certainly serve to termi-
nate the relationship for federal income tax purposes. Whether
50 I. T. 3669, 1944 CB 112.
51 Int. Rev. Code §23(c) (3) ; 26 U. S. C. A. § 23(c) (3).
52 Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U. S. 394, 62 S. Ct. 1162, 86 L. Ed. 1555 (1942).
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a decree a mensa et thoro or one of separate maintenance would
so serve has not been decided but, in cases of annulment, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue has ruled that payments made pur-
suant to an annulment decree, if such decree is based on a cause
which made the marriage void ab initio, are not to be considered
as "alimony" payments. 53
In much the same way, the federal tax law permits credits
against net income in specified amounts for certain dependent
relatives of the taxpayer. The law mentions, among other speci-
fied relationships, that a legally adopted child is to be considered
as a blood child of the taxpayer.54 Adoption by adequate legal
proceedings according to the law of the pertinent state jurisdic-
tion would be necessary for a legal guardian does not, solely by
reason of such relationship, qualify for the dependency credit."
As to other relationships mentioned in the list of dependent rela-
tives, the Treasury Regulations do provide that if a relationship
by affinity has once existed it is not terminated either by divorce
or death of the spouse, 56 thereby making it unnecessary to consult
the appropriate state law, but other problems which theoretically
could arise have been left undetermined. Typical of these are
such questions as to whether illegitimate as well as legitimate
children are to be included, whether the term "brother-in-law,"
for example, extends to the husband of a wife's sister, and
whether the first, divorced wife of the father is a "stepmother"
to the children of the father by his second wife. These, and other
questions, would be apt to receive differing answers if state law
is ultimately held to control 57 so, in the interest of uniformity of
administration, some uniform federal rule should be devised.
Many tax consequences flow from the fact of death, whether
of a taxpayer, his relatives, his partners, or others. Ordinarily,
the date of a person's death is readily ascertainable but circum-
stances may arise where a presumptive date of death must be
51 Bureau letter, Dec. 8. 1944, 454 CCH 6092.
54 Int. Rev. Code § 25; 26 U. S. C. A. § 25.
5 Mim. 5327, 1942-1 CB 81.
56 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.25-3.
57 See, for illustration, 471 CCH 358D.065.
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used, as in case of an unexplained disappearance for a long
period of time. Here again there is no effective authority but
seemingly state rules should be used. Certainly, a judicial deter-
mination of death under state law should be controlling for federal
tax purposes.58
Two other notable changes in the matter of tax computation
must be noted. Prior to 1944, responsibility for reporting the
earnings of a minor child and paying the tax thereon depended
upon state law. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the
parent was assumed to have the legal right to the earnings of a
minor child so was required to include them in his return. Termi-
nation of minority, by emancipation or by reaching the age of
majority, necessarily varied with local law. As the law now
stands, the minor is taxed on his own income, without regard to
state law, except that the parent or person entitled to the services
of the child remains liable for any tax attributable to the minor's
earnings which belong to the parent under local law if the minor
does not pay. 9 The power of a minor to enter into a contract
affecting his earnings, however, would still apparently depend on
state law.60
The other change was also brought about by statutory amend-
ment. The Internal Revenue Code now states:
In the case of a wife who is divorced or legally separated
from her husband under a decree of divorce or of separate
maintenance, periodic payments . . received subsequent to
such decree in discharge of or attributable to property trans-
ferred (in trust or otherwise) in discharge of, a legal obliga-
tion which, because of the marital or family relationship, is
imposed upon or incurred by such husband under such decree
z8 Where actual date of death is not known and a presumptive date of death is
determined under federal law for members of the armed forces missing in action,
the presumptive date of death governs for tax purposes: 1. T. 3750, 1945 CR 126;
I. T. 3771, 1945 CB 194.
59 Int. Rev. Code § 22(m) ; 26 U. S. C. A. § 22(m). See also U. S. Treas. Reg.
111, § 29.22(m)-1.
60 For the general proposition that assignments are to be governed by the lex loci
contractus, see Lum v. Commissioner, 147 F. (2d) 356 (1945), and Blair v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 330, 81 L. Ed. 465 (1937).
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or under a written instrument incident to such divorce or
separation shall be includible in the gross income of such
wife .... 1
In accordance therewith, amounts taxed to the wife are either
excluded from the husband's income or are allowed as deductions
to him, depending upon whether they are attributable to property
transferred to the wife or represent items paid by the husband.
62
The question of whether a divorce or legal separation has oc-
curred is, of course, determined by reference to state law." Pay-
ments under a judgment annulling a marriage, void ab initio
according to state law, are not to be considered,64 and a property
agreement executed in anticipation of divorce will be effective
only if approved by the divorce court as a final settlement or
otherwise made a part of the state court decree. 65 Whether pay-
ments are "periodic" within the meaning of the statute must,
of course, be determined by reference to the terms of the decree,66
but if the decree or instrument specifies that the sums are payable
for the support of minor children they are taxable to the husband
rather than to the wife. Whether amounts so paid may be con-
sidered as paid for the support of dependents, to entitle one to
claim a dependency credit, also must be settled by reference to
the terms of the decree. 7 As a practical matter, the net result
of the change is that state divorce and separate maintenance
decrees are now written largely with the federal income tax pro-
visions in mind,68 or at least with an awareness of some of the tax
consequences which may flow from the payment of alimony or
support money.
,1 Int. Rev. Code §22(k) ; 26 U. S. C. A. § 22(k).
62 Ibid., § 22(k) and § 23(u).
60. Kalchthaler, 7 TC 625, CCH 15,336 (1946): I. T. 3761, 1945 CB 76.
64 Bureau Letter, Dec. 8, 1944, 454 CCH 6092.
65 Miller, 2 TC 285, CCH Dec. 13,315 (1943), acq. noted.
66 Int. Rev. Code § 22(k) declares such payments must be "specified in the decree
or instrument."
67 Ibid. See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(k)-1(d).
68 Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 Yale L. J. 799 (1943), particularly
pp. 805-8.
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III. TAX COLLECTION
Federal law declares that unpaid federal taxes are to be a
lien, in favor of the United States, upon "all property and rights
to property, whether real or personal, belonging to" the tax-
payer.Y9 In addition, it provides for the collection of "the lia-
bility, at law or in equity, of a transferee of property of a tax-
payer." 70 A "transferee" is defined, in the regulations, to include
"an heir, legatee, devisee, distributee of an estate of a deceased
person, the shareholder of a dissolved corporation, the assignee
or donee of an insolvent person, the successor of a corporation,
a party to a reorganization. . . and all other classes of distribu-
tees." 71 The term has been held to include any person who re-
ceives assets of the taxpayer for an inadequate consideration. 72
With respect to the first of these statutory provisions, the
state exemption laws generally do not serve to save the property
of the taxpayei; from the federal tax lien. For example, a pro-
yision of a Louisiana statute purporting to exempt the proceeds
of insurance policies from the payment of debts was regarded
ineffective to prevent the enforcement of an income tax lien.73 In
the same way, a provision of the Texas Constitution which ex-
.empts homesteads from forced sale has been held not to prevent
the sale of a homestead to satisfy a federal tax lien.74 But the tax
cannot ordinarily be collected from property which, under state
law, belongs to someone other than the taxpayer. If, then, as
under Oklahoma law prior to its present communhity property
statute, a husband and wife are granted an indivisible and vested
interest in homestead property which neither may transfer with-
out the consent of the other, an income tax lien based on the
tax liability of a husband will fail because of the wife's interest.75
In another case, arising under Colorado law, the wife was a bene-
69Int. Rev. Code §3670; 26 U. S. C. A. §3670.
o 0Ibid., §311(1).
71 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.311-1.
72 Costanza, 16 BTA 1294, CCH Dec. 5306 (1929).
7.1 Smith v. Donnelly, 65 F. Supp. 415 (1946).
74 Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F. (2d) 345 (1943).
75 Jones v. Kemp, 144 F. (2d) 478 (1944): Bigley v. Jones, 64 F. Supp. 389
(1946).
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ficiary under and enjoyed certain property rights in an annuity
insurance policy taken out by.her husband for her benefit. Sale
of the whole policy for the husband's tax liability was enjoined,
even though the husband retained the right to clange the bene-
ficiary.76 A lien for taxes due from a lessor cannot be impressed
upon funds in the hands of a lessee,77 and it has been held that a
valid gift of stock, even to the taxpayer's wife, is sufficient to de-
feat a lien for taxes if it is asserted after the transfer.7  State
exemption granted to the income of a spendthrift trust, however,
has been held ineffective to prevent the collection of income taxes
assessed upon the trust income.7 9
Under the second or transferee section, the Commissioner
must show all facts necessary to establish a liability at law or
in equity.80  One authority has stated that the "liability here
referred to is plainly under state law,'"'s but when questions
under state exemption statutes have arisen, as upon insurance
policy proceeds paid to a widow against whom transferee-liability
for her deceased husband's income tax has been asserted, the
decisions are not uniform and no conclusive authority is to be
found in the decided cases. The Supreme Court noted and re-
served the question in Phillips v. Coimissioner of Internal Rev-
euiltep2 but has not considered it since. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals squarely held, after thoughtful consideration, that the
question was one of federal law.8 3 The Seventh Circuit has held
76 Cannon v. Nicholas, 80 F. (2d) 934 (1935).
77 United States v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 50 F. (2d) 102 (1931) ; United
States v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 52 F. Supp. 553 (1943).
78 Driver v. Hooper, 42-2 USTC 9687.
79 In re Rosenberg's Will. 26) N. Y. 247, 199 N. E. 206 (1935), cert. den. 298
U. S. 669, 56 S. Ct. 834. 80 L. Ed. 1392 (1936). The state statute there involved
limited creditors' claims to 10% of the income. See also United States v. Dallas
Nat. Bank, 152 F. (2d) 582 (1946) ; United States v. Dallas Nat. Bank, 67 F. Stpp.
573 (1946).
8OTemoyan, 16 BTA 923, CCR Dec. 5232 (1929), nonacq. noted. -The Government
has, for example, been held entitled to take advantage of noncompliance with the
notice requirements of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 1214, § 78, dealing with bulk sales:
United States v. Goldblatt Bros., 128 F. (2d) 576 (1942).
81 Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation (Callaghan & Co., Chicago. 1938). Second
series, p. 12, without citation.
82283 U. S. 589, 51 S. Ct. 608, 75 L. Ed. 1289 (1931).
83 Commissioner v. Western Union Tel. Co.. 141 F. (2d) 774 (1944).
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the same way. 4 There is, however, a decision in the Fifth Cir-
cuit, relying upon earlier decisions of the Second Circuit now
superseded, indicating that state law controls,8 5 and the Eighth
Circuit has said much the same thing, relying upon authorities
which hardly seem in point.86 A recent decision from the Third
Circuit summarizes the matter as follows:
On principle the question seems to us to be clearly one to be
answered without reference to state law limitations. It would
not be disputed that, in general, the imposition and collection
of federal income tax is a federal function. One of the
questions arising from such an undertaking is the determina-
tion of when B is to be liable to pay a tax assessed against A.
The Congress could, no doubt, have left this question to be
variously determined by the laws of the states if it had so
desired. But in the absence of a clearly expressed intention
to do so, we should not infer it, for such variation does not
fit into a uniformly applied system of federal taxation. 1
By specific federal provision, however, a lien for federal taxes is
not valid as against any subsequent mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser
or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed in the
office authorized by state law in the state where the property sub-
ject to the lien is situated, or with the clerk of the appropriate
district court if the state involved has not designated any office. 8
General state requirements as to the form of notice, acknowledg-
ment and the like required to perfect a lien are of no consequence,
as it is the fact of filing which is the only important thing.8 9
Since the decision in Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,90 determinations of fact made by the Tax Court are not
subject to review before other federal tribunals although its hold-
ings on questions of law are open to re-examination. A problem
is, therefore, posed as to whether or not a determination by that
body on the condition or scope of the law of a particular state,
8 Commissioner v. Keller, 59 F. (2d) 499 (1932).
85 Liquidators of Exchange Nat. Bank v. United States, 65 F. (2d) 316 (1933).
86 Botz v. l-elvering, 134 F. (2d) .538 (1943).
87 Pearlman v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 560 at 562 (1946).
88 Int. Rev. Code § 3672; 26 U. S. C. A. § 3672.
89 Sen. Fin. Comm. Report of 1942 Revenue Act, 1942-2 CB 504 at 686.
90 320 U. S. 489. ;4 S. Ct. 239, 88 L. Ed. 248 (1944).
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as distinguished from a determination as to whether state law
is to govern at all or, if so, then which particular state law should
govern, presents a question of fact not open to further determi-
nation.91 Where the situation requires application of doctrines
arising under the conflict of laws, however, the question is essen-
tially a legal one so that the Tax Court ruling is not final.
2  It
happens that cases in which there is opportunity for selection
between the laws of two or more states are quite rare. The com-
munity property cases are likely to be more prevalent than others
and there the law of the domicile has generally been applied 93
but, where ownership of real property has been involved, the law
of the situs has been followed.9 4  Questions concerning choice of
law have not, however, been given detailed examination in the
preparation of this article.
It might be suggested, by way of conclusion, that the general
lack of uniformity thus found to exist in the federal decisions
tends to indicate that each situation must be considered afresh,
with little help from analogy. The relationship between state
and federal law, despite thirty-three years of litigation and legis-
lation, is still in an expanding phase for approximately one-half
of the 300-odd court decisions on income tax liability rendered in
the past year, excluding completely the Tax Court decisions an-
nounced in the same period, presented questions of state law
either directly or by implication. If, then, uniformity is desirable,
and it would seem that it should be in tax matters if anywhere,
the remedy must be provided by Congress.
91 There is. as yet. little direct authority on the extent to which the Dobson rule
applies in determining state law for federal tax purposes. Determination is, how-
ever, made independently of the doctrine in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64.
58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938), which is applicable in other fields where
special federal statutes are not involved. See note in 59 Harv. L. Rev. 948 (1946).
92 John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner of Tnt. Revenue. 326 U. S. 521, 66 S. Ct. 299,
90 L. Ed. (adv.) 257 (1946). Although admittedly dictum, the court there men-
tioned, as true legal questions, "situations which involve conflicts of laws."
93 Von Der Hellen, TC mem. op., 5 TCM -. CCH Dec. 15.329(M) (1946) ; Grafe,
TC mem. op., 5 TCM -, CCH Dec. 14.988(M) (1946) : Kastel, TC mem. op., 4 TCM
1006, CCH Dec. 14,842(M) (1945). See also Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F. (2d)
566 (1945).
94 Hammonds v. Commissioner, 106 F. (2d) 420 (1939). Cahn, Local Law in
Federal Taxation. 52 Yale L. J. 799 (1943). at 821, suggests that in determining
state law generally for federal tax purposes, the local law is that of the "economic
situs," whatever other law might govern tho property or transaction in ordinary
civil litigation.
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DATMAGES FOR DEFAMATION BY RADIO.
With a growing tendency on the part of more and more radio
personalities to indulge in the practice of "ad-libbing," the legal problem-
posed in the case of Locke v. Gibbons' assumes greater importance. It
had there been determined that as the alleged defamatory matter had
been spoken into a microphone without the benefit of a written script
the same constituted a slander, rather than a libel, so that in the absence
of an allegation of special damage, no cause of action had been stated in
view of the fact that the alleged defamatory matter was not slanderous
per se.2 Had the same been treated as a libel, judgment for at least
nominal damages would have been required." The reason underlying
any such distinction rests purely on historical accident,4 has not passed
uncondemned, 5 and now seems wholly illogical when applied to cases of
defamation occurring during a radio broadcast.
A system of jurisprudence which provides for so strict an adherence
to the past for the determination of novel situations like the one presented
in the Locke case can only lead to unjust and inequitable judgments.
Many have commented on the fact that the complexities of our present
machine age cannot wisely be settled, in a scientific era, by principles
formulated long before such developments as the radio were conceived
or envisaged. Thus Gmelin asserts: "It follows that the essential
element in the administration of justice is to be sought in a place different
from that in which it has been looked for in the past. The very kernel
of the work of the judiciary lies in the just government of the real in-
terests and possessions of human beings. The scholastic and dialectical
1164 Misc. 877, 299 N. Y. S. 188 (1937). affirmed without opinion in 253 App.
Div. 887, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 1015 (1938). In the companion case of Locke v. Benton
& Bowles, Inc.. 165 Misc. 631, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 240 (1937). a motion to dismiss
the complaint had been denied but that order was reversed. 253 App. Div. 369,
2 N. Y. S. (2d) 150 (1938). on the ground that the pleader should provide a con-
trast between the script as written and the actual broadcast presented.
2 Pollard v. Lyon. 91 U. S. 225, 23 L. Ed. 308 (1876) : Marion v. Davis, 217 Ala.
16, 114 So. 357 (1927).
* Jones v. Register & Leader Co., 177 Iowa 144, 158 N. W. 571 (1916).
4 See Restatement. Torts, §568, historical note, and Jones v. Jones, [1916] 2 A. C.
481 at 489.
5 Lord Mansfield, in Thorley v. Lord Kerry. 4 Taunt. 355 at 365, 128 Eng. Rep.
367 at 371 (1812), noted that "an assertion made in a public place, as upon the
Royal Exchange, concerning a merchant in London, may be much more extensively
diffused than a few printed papers dispersed. or a private letter : it is true that a
newspaper may be very generally read but that is all casual." His statement
would seem much stronger if the words were spoken into a microphone.
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method prevailing today, attempting as it does to draw the decision as a
logical conclusion from the legal rule, by means of verbal interpretation
supplemented by purely verbal inferences, without proper weighing of
conflicting interests and without considering whether the result will be
reasonable or not, is decidedly wrong. Unless we realize that it is the
business of courts to serve the interests of actual life and to adapt their
judgments to them, instead of forcing the facts into a bed of Procrustes
according to some schematic formula, we are on the wrong road, and
we shall err fatally in imagining that we can ever obtain certainty of law
in this manner."6 Dean Pound has pointed out that the real danger to
the "administration of justice according to law is in timid resistance to
rational improvement and obstinate persistence in legal paths which have
become impossible in the heterogeneous, urban, industrial America of
today. "7 Justice Holmes once expressed his contempt for superannuated
archaic precedents by stating: "It is revolting to have no better reason
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.
It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past."s
While some hold to the view that the rule of stare decisis requires
strict and immutable adherence to earlier precedents9 because such an
attitude gives permanency to the law, they overlook the fact that it
deprives the law of adaptability to meet changing conditions. The better
view would seem to be that precedent may serve as a strong formative
influence without establishing a rigid pattern to which all future cases
must strictly conform. As the legally operative factors in a rule of
law change, the rule should change with them and courts have felt free
to depart from the common law whenever they have found that precedent
was wrongly decided' or when less mischief would come from reversal
than from the perpetuation of outmoded ideas." It is true that judges,
reluctant to overrule existing law, often render lip-service to the status
6 Johann Georg Gmelin, Science of Legal Methods. Mlodern Legal Philosophy
Series, Vol. IX, pp. 123-4.
7 Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (Marshall Jones Co., Boston, 1921), p.
Xii.
8 Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (Harcourt, Brace & Howe, New York, 1920),
p. 187.
9 Salmond, Science of Legal Method. Modern Legal Philosophy Series. Vol. IX.
p. lxxxiii. for example, indicates that a judge "is bound by the decisions of his
predecessors, not because they were necessarily or even presumably wiser than he
is-not because their decisions are necessarily or presumably more correct than
those at which he would himself arrive-but because it is in the public interest
that questions once decided should remain decided."
10 Hicks, Materials and Methods of Legal Research (Lawvyers Co-operative Pub.
Co.. Rochester, New York, 1923), p. 85.
11 Cooley, Const. Lim., 8th Ed., pp. 108-24.
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quo, 12 but recent decisions do tend to reveal a willingness on the part of
the judiciary to disregard precedents, frankly and on other factors than
those implicit in a system of common law.' 3 One is, then, confounded
to note the court, in the Locke case, stating that courts "cannot legislate
to eradicate the long established distinction between libel and slander,' 14
particularly when that distinction becomes faced with a new technique
in defamation.
The subject of radio defamation is not so new that it has not received
some attention. In Summit Hotel Company v. National Broadcasting
Company,15 the court acknowledged the special characteristics thereof
by saying: "Publication by radio has physical aspects entirely different
from those attending the publication of a libel or a slander as the law
understands them. The danger of attempting to apply the fixed principles
of law governing either libel or slander to this new medium of com-
munication is obvious. But the law is not so firmly and rigidly cast that
it is incapable of meeting a new wrong as the demands of progress and
change require."16 Judge Otis, in Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting
Company,17 likewise noted a difference between the utterance of the
natural voice and its electrical transmission. He said: "I conceive there
is a close analogy between such a situation and the publication in a news-
paper . . . The latter prints the libel on paper and broadcasts it to
the reading world. The owner of a radio station 'prints' the libel on
a different medium just as widely or even more widely 'read.' "s Some
authors would call such conduct libel;:19 others would abolish any dis-
12 For example, the idea of the sanctity of the seal was riddled with exceptions
and distinctions before it was reduced to a mere shadow. Judges have coined the
phrase "instinct with an obligation" to support certain contracts which, according
to their terms, only bound one side: Wood v. Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E.
214 (1917). They have resorted to a "technical trespass" to permit recovery for
damage from falling debris caused by blasting without negligence: Hay v. The
Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159 (1848). Other illustrations will, no doubt, come readily to
mind.
13 In Hermitage v. Goldfogle. 204 App. Div. 710, 199 N. Y. S. 382 (1923), affirmed
in 236 N. Y. 553, 142 N. E. 281 (1923). tax exemption on new construction built to
alleviate intolerable housing conditions was justified on sociological, rather than
legal, grounds. The opinion of Bijur, J., in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson.
130 Misc. 110, 222 N. Y. S. 5.32 (1927). limits the latitude found in the corporate
entity theory by reference to "justice" and "fairness" rather than to legal syllogisms.
14 164 Misc. 877 at 880, 299 N. Y. S. 188 at 192.
15 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. (2d) 302 (1939).
16336 Pa. 182 at 200, 8 A. (2d) 302 at 310.
17 8 F. Stpp. 89 (1934).
18 8 F. Supp. 889 at 890.
19 Zollman, Law of the Air (Bruce Publishing Company. Milwaukee, Wis.. 1927).
p. 125; Seelman, The Law of Libel and Slander in New York (.1. B. Lyon Company.
Albany, New York, 1933), p. 3; VoId. The Basis for Liability for Defamation by
Radio, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 611 (1935).
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tinction between libel and slander. '0 At least three states have recognized
that if the defamatory words spoken over the radio are read from a
prepared script they are to be treated as libelous in nature,21 although
it may be said that precedent supports this view.22 One is led to inquire
how the radio audience is to know whether the matter being spoken is
being read or recited from memory, 23 but the courts seem to have made
some point over the distinction.
If distinction must still be drawn between libel and slander, it
would seem that scientific developments dictate that the division should
be between the manner of projection, whether simply oral or by me-
chanical impulse, rather than whether the defamation reaches the general
public through the aural or the optic nerves. It is true that inventions
have increased and improved the facility of circulating written or printed
matter, but such progress is trivial compared to the potency bestowed upon
the spoken word operating through mechanical devices for, through them,
the defamation may not only be transmitted over the greater part of the
earth in a moment of time but may be simultaneously fashioned into
permanent form. Such verbal puissance did not exist when the courts
first distinguished speech from writing or print. Any suggestion that
such phenomena might some day be possible would have been ridiculed
as beyond the realm of even the weird and fanciful. Yet it is now an
accomplished scientific fact.
The existence of a distinction between the natural voice and the
broadcasted one was noted by Justice Brandeis, in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle
Realty Company,24 where lie said: "We are satisfied that the reception
of a radio broadcast and its translation into audible sound is not a mere
audition of the original program. It is essentially a reproduction. As
to the general theory of radio transmission there is no disagreement.
All sounds consist of waves of relatively low frequencies which ordinarily
pass through the air and are locally audible. Thus music played at
a distant broadcasting studio is not directly heard at the receiving
20 Veeder. The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 Col. L. Rev. 33
(1904).
21 Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932) : Hartmann v. Winchell.
187 Misc. 54, 6.3 N. Y. S. (2d) 225 (1946) ;Hryhorijiv v. Winchell, 180 Misc. 575,
45 N. Y. S. (2d) 31 (1943). See also Polakoff v. Hill, 261 App. Div. 777, 27 N. Y. S.
(2d) 142 (1941) ; Weglein v. Golder, 317 Pa. 437, 177 A. 47 (1935) ; Restatement.
Torts, § 568. The Restatement does not purport to lay down any definite rule as to
extemporaneous remarks. See criticism by Farnum, Radio Defamation and the
American Law Institute, 16 Bost. L. Rev. 1 (1936).
22 Reading written defamatory matter aloud has been treated as libel in M'Coombs
v. Tuttle, 5 Ind. (5 Blackf.) 431 (1840) ; Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 43
(1849) ; Adams v. Lawson, 58 Va. (17 Grat.) 250 (1867).
23 See Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61., 74 P. (2d) 1127 (1938).
24 283 U. S. 191, 51 S. Ct. 410, 75 L. Ed. 971 (1931).
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set. In the microphone of the radio transmitter the sound waves are used
to modulate electrical currents of relatively high frequencies which are
broadcast through an entirely different medium, conventionally known
as the 'ether.' These radio waves are not audible. In the receiving
set they are rectified; that is, converted into direct currents which ac-
tivate the loud speaker to produce again in the air sound waves of
audible frequency. The modulation of the radio waves in the transmit-
ting apparatus, by the audible sound waves is comparable to the manner
in which the wax phonograph record is impressed by these same waves
through the medium of a recording stylus."2- As the voice of the speaker
does not travel the airways but merely sets a mechanism into action per-
mitting an electrical product to be disseminated, the broadcast is the
product of voice and electrical radiation combined. The voice alone
could no more be called the source of defamation than could the finger
which presses the trigger be called the source of the bullet which kills.
Should not the courts, then, attach different legal consequences to
defamation spread completely by the pure natural voice as contrasted
with that which is spread through an instrument activated by the human
voice but made more dangerous by the tremendous potentialities thereby
created? To hold that direct address to a present audience is legally
the same as a radio broadcast is as preposterous as to assert that holding
a lighted match in the ordinary atmosphere is the equivalent of placing
it into a gas chamber! Seelman, who would allow application of the
rule as to general damages to defamation in the course of a radio broad-
cast by reason of its resemblance to libel, states: "The widest circula-
tion of the greatest newspaper is insignificant when compared to the
audience of a national broadcast. The speaker over the radio often pre-
pares his speech and submits it to the broadcasting authorities. Tech-
nically it is then published as a libel; but when he speaks, it is the voice
which scatters his words to millions. He speaks with prepared delibera-
tion; and to a vast, if an uncountable, audience. To them his words are
still unrecorded. Even here, the words, eagerly awaited with radio ac-
quisitiveness. may leave a record as permanent as if the eye had seen
the printed page. The rules of libel and not slander should here apply."'
He might have noted, bearing on the extensive character of the
damage that is likely to follow, that spoken defamation may be less dele-
terious if limited to the locality of its utterance but that it bears inherent
characteristics which can make it more damaging than print if given an
identical sphere of publication with the latter. Modulation and inflection
of speech carry more conviction than cold print. The chance of mis-
25 283 U. S. 191 at 199-200, 51 S. Ct. 410. 75 L. Ed. 971 at 977. Notes omitted.
26 Seelman. op. cit., p. 3.
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quotation is multiplied, for the very fact that writing has a physical
existence makes misquotation less likely. Pope well knew how speech
might be distorted when he wrote:
"The flying rumours gathered as they rolled
And all who told it added something new
And all who heard it made enlargement too
In every ear it spreads, on every tongue it grew . . .",27
The courts can hardly be less aware of the danger inherent in a wide
dissemination of defamatory matter of that character.
Other elements may serve to justify the classification of defamatory
radio broadcasts with other forms of libel. While slander involves no
other conduct than the act of speaking, except perhaps for an accompany-
ing gesture, a series of acts must precede the publication of a libel. So,
too, in radio. The actual defamation by speaking into a microphone
requires the setting up of the device, connecting it with the means of
transmission, and the actual operation and control thereof during the
course of transmission. These acts may be nondefamatory in themselves
but, when coupled with the actual speaking, partake of its character
and make the entire performance into one composite act. 28  Certainly,
if a simultaneous recording of the broadcast is made an even stronger
resemblance to libel is presented".2  True the oral utterance precedes
the recording into permanent form, but there is no factual difference
of sufficient merit to require a different legal result for it was intimated,
in Ostrowe v. Lee,30 that placing defamation in permanent form contem-
poraneously with its oral publication is a libel. 1
Enough has probably been said to show that the law is unrealistic if
it persists in treating defamation over the radio as a species of slander.
27 Pope, The Temple of Fame, p. 463.
28 Void, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio. 19 Minn. L. Rev. 611 at
640-1 (19:35), suggests that attempts to classify defamation by radio "on principle"
as constituting slander are hopelessly erroneous. He states: "Radio transmission
in that case. as in every other case, takes place through active operations by the
broadcaster whiclh manifestly constitute 'conduct' on his part rather than mere
speech. Unless the term 'slander' is to be so enlarged as to cover not only oral
speech but defamation by conduct as well, the facts of radio transmission of de-
famatory utterances do not fall within it. On the other hand, defamation by con-
duct has ordinarily by the authorities been held equivalent to libel."
29 Defamation written in disappearing ink or spread in the sky by smoke from an
airplane would be treated as libel, even though the script be of evanescent char-
acter. The recording of a broadcast, avaitable for use on other occasions without
further conduct, is far more permanent than these.
30 256 N. Y. 36, 175 N. E. 505 (1931).
31 In that case, dictation to a stenographer of defamatory matter was regarded
as libelous upon a rereading thereof by the stenographer as the notes were exam-
ined and transcribed. Should a distinction be made if the stenographer finds it
unnecessary to transcribe her notes?
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What attitude, then, should the law take? In some states, legislation has
been enacted treating such conduct as criminal but without attempting
to classify it':- or putting it in the class of criminal libel."I In other
states, legislation has been designed to limit the liability of the operator
of the radio station but uses either the term "libel" or the term "slander"
without discrimination ;34 evidencing some confusion in the minds of
legislators. None of these statutes purport to settle the civil problems
with respect to the nature of the tort or the measure of damage. Settle-
ment thereof has been left, so far, to the courts. Are they firm enough
to sweep away established doctrines not in accord with scientific develop-
ments; doctrines which shackle by the dead weight of precedent?
Many may urge that courts cannot legislate to eradicate established
law, but they may be answered, at least in this respect, by a quotation
from Francois Geny. He wrote: "Whenever it is the business of a
judge to discover what the law is in fields in which it has not yet been
formulated, his functions have an appearance analogous to that of the
legislator himself . . . the considerations that must guide the judge
in accordance with the end to be attained are exactly the same as those
which would influence the legislator. For the one as well as the other
aims at promoting by an appropriate rule the ends of justice and social
utility . . . when the formal sources are silent or insufficient .
he should formulate his decision in accordance with the same considera-
tions which the legislator would have in mind if he were to prescribe
rules relating to the question at issue.'"'1 That courts have done so
many times in the past is beyond dispute, for even the very law of
defamation is judge-made.
It would be useless to trace the steps by which the doctrine of stare
decisis, at one time, obtained so strong a hold on our law and made the
"sacredness of precedent" a template of justice,36 or to follow the de-
velopment of the strict division of powers of government among the
three co-ordinate branches. 7  The fact is that such ideas no longer hold
32 Deering, Cal. Penal Code, § 258: Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 126, § 4; Ore. Comp.
Laws Ann., § 23.437.
33 Remington, Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann.. Vol. 4. § 2424 supp.
34 Fla. Stat. 1941. Ch. 770.03; Burns. Ind. Stat. 1933, 1943 supp. i 2.518; Iowa
Code 1946, Ch. 659.5; Rev. Code Mont., 1939 supp.. Ch. 3A, § 5694.1.
35 Geny, Science of Legal Method, Modern Legal Philosophy Series. Vol. IX. pp.
4-5.
36 See Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law. 2d Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 203-6.
3 Cohen, Law and the Social Order (Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1973),
p. 115, notes the fact that no such strict division exists today.
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true for, if they did, social progress would be immobilized. 8  Because
the courts, at one time, held that oral defamation, if not slanderous
per se, was actionable only if special damage could be shown is no reason
to forever impose such a limitation. As courts once were willing to
recognize the more serious consequences that flowed from giving the
defamatory matter permanence and wider dissemination, so they should
now recognize the more serious dangers flowing from an improper use of
a new method of transmitting ideas. The question should not be was a
voice involved but rather, is this type of disparagement a new method
of spreading defamation calling for new and more stringent punishment?
M. S. MARKS.
38 Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Brentano, New York, 1930), pp. 6-7, indi-
cates how, when human relationships are transforming daily, "legal relationships
cannot be expressed in enduring form. The constant development of unprecedented
problems requires a legal system capable of fluidity and pliancy . . . although
changes cannot be made lightly, yet law must be more or less impermanent, experi-
mental and therefore not nicely calculable. Much of the uncertainty of law Is not
an unfortunate accident: it is of immense social value."
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ARMY AND NAvY-WAR RISK INSURANCE-WHETHER OR NOT BENEFI-
CIARY CLAIMING RELATIONSHIP IN Loco PARENTIS MAY R.ECEIVE BENEFITS
OF NATIONAL SERVICE LIFE INSURANCE ACT WHEN RELATIONSHIP AROSE
BETWEEN ADULTS-In Zazove v. United States,' an adult beneficiary
designated in a policy of insurance issued pursuant to the National
Service Life Insurance Act 2 brought suit to establish her right to
receive payments under the policy after the government had denied
her right thereto.' The heirs at law of the insured were made third-
party defendants and filed a counterclaim for the proceeds on the
ground that the beneficiary, although designated as aunt, was in fact
1 156 F. (2d) 24 (1946).
2 54 Stat. 1008, as amended by 5' Stat. 657; 38 U. S. C. A. §§ 801-2.
3 Maulis v. United States, 56 F. (2d) 444 (1931), indicates that action in denying
a claim is sufficient ground to war-ant application to the courts. See also United
States v. Williams, 278 U. S. 255, 49 S. Ct. 97, 73 L. Ed. 314 (1929).
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no relative of the insured hence was not entitled thereto. Plaintiff,
admitting the lack of blood relationship, then contended that, as she
stood in loco parentis to the deceased soldier for more than a year
prior to his entry into service, she was such a person as might be
named as beneficiary.' It appeared that the insured, when 25 years
of age, had gone to live with the plaintiff, then 48, and had continued
to reside with her for over four years prior to his entrance into service
and the issuance of the policy in question. The District Court held
that the relationship of in loco parentis could not arise between adult
persons and awarded the proceeds to the insured's heirs. Upon appeal
by the plaintiff, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed on the ground that a liberal construction of the congressional
language forbade imposing a technical meaning upon the words "in loco
parentis" and, since there was no dispute as to the acts which established
that relationship, it ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
As the common definition for the phrase "in loco parentis" indi-
cates that the person be one "who has put himself in the situation of a
lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental rela-
tion, without going through the formalities necessary to a legal adoption,"'
it has been held that the relationship could only exist between an adult
and a minor.6 That, at least, has been the tenor of the few Illinois cases
on the subject,' and would seem to be a necessary inference to be drawn
from any statutes dealing with related problems" or from analogous
4 At the time the policy was issued, the act declared: "The insurance shall be
payable only to a ... parent (including person in loco parentis if designated as
beneficiary by the insured) ... The insured shall have the right to designate the
beneficiary . . . but only within the classes herein provided .. " 54 Stat. 1008 at
1010, 38 U. S. C. A. § 802(g). The statute was subsequently amended to delete the
phrase "including person in loco parentis if designated as beneficiary by the in-
sured" and substituted instead the words: "The terms 'parent,' . . . include . . .
persons who have stood in loco parentis to a member of the military or naval forces
at any time prior to entry into active service for a period of not less than one year."
See 56 Stat. 657 at 659, 38 U. S. C. A. §§ 801(f) and 802(g).
5 46 C. J., Parent and Child, § 174, p. 1334.
6 Ex Parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140, 34 Eng. Rep. 271 (1811). See also 2 Williams on
Executors, 7th Am. Ed., p. 652, where emphasis is put on the idea that the person
in loco parentis must be one who "puts himself in the situation of the lawful father
of the child, with reference to the father's office and duty of making provision for
the child."
7 See Brush v. Blanchard, 18 Ill. 46 (1854). The later holding in Faber v. Indus-
trial Commission, 352 Ill. 115, 185 N. E. 255 (1933), indicates that the doctrine has
remained unchanged.
s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 4, § 1-1, dealing with adoption, restricts the proceeding
to cover adoption of minor children only. See also Brown v. Hall, 385 Il1. 260, 52
N. E. (2d) 781 (1944). For purpose of inheritance taxation, the phrase is expressly
limited to apply only if the "acknowledged" child was fifteen years of age or under:
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 120, § 375(5). See, however, In re Beach's Estate, 154 N.
Y. 242, 48 N. E. 516 (1897), where the court held that it was no bar to a tax
exemption that the relationship originated at a time when both parties were adults.
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decisions.' Such has also been the policy followed by the Veterans' Ad-
ministration ° when applying the provisions of the War Risk Insurance
Act of 1917 as amended,1 1 or of the World War Veterans Relief Act of
1924.12
Prior to the instant case, only three decisions of the specific point
had been rendered by federal district courts. In Tudor v. United States"
the court said that the relationship was a legal impossibility where the
so-called "child" had reached majority and was capable of providing
for himself. Much the same result was achieved in Howard v. United
States."4 In the case of Meisner v. United States," however, an opposite
result was reached upon a set of facts where the insured, an adult at
the time the relationship arose, had designated the daughter of the so-
called "parents" as beneficiary, describing her as his "sister." Upon
finiding that the "parent-child" relationship existed, the court concluded
that the beneficiary was within the permitted class," for it said the
statute should be accepted "in accordance with common understanding"7
and, in the absence of express limitation, would permit the relationship
to arise between adults. The instant case has now brought the balance
even insofar as the decisions deal specifically with insurance policies
issued to veterans.'" A different result, however, has been reached in
cases involving policies issued by private companies. 19
It is probably desirable that such should be the case in view of the
liberal attitude the courts have generally taken in favor of servicemen 20
and the policy of liberalism which permeates the entire structure of war
risk insurance. Identical language in the present and prior acts ought
9 Bartholomew v. Davies, 276 Ill. 505, 114 N. E. 1017 (1917); Capek v. Kropik,
129 Ill. 509, 21 N. E. 836 (1889).
10 See Administrator's Decisions No. 536 and No. 675.
11 41 Stat. 371, Ch. 16, § 4, since repealed.
12 43 Stat. 607-8, § 3(5) ; 38 U. S. C. A. § 424(5).
'336 F. (2d) 386 (1929).
14 2 F. (2d) 170 (1924).
15 295 F. 866 (1924).
1 Although the policy was issued under the War Risk Insurance Act of 1917 as
amended, 41 Stat. 371, since repealed, Its provisions are analogous to the statute
here concerned.
17 295 F. 866 at 868.
18 Since the foregoing was written, another case from the same district as the
Meisner case, that of Horsman v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 522 (1946), involving
the same general problem, has reached an identical result as that achieved in the
Meisner case and the instant one. The preponderance of weight, then, now favors
the instant case.
19 Hummel v. Supreme Conclave, Improved Order Heptasophs, 256 Pa. 164, 100 A.
589 (1917).
2OBoyette v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 66 (1936) ; United States v. Martin, 54 F.
(2d) 554 (1931) ; McNally v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 440 (1931) ; United States
v. Sligh, 31 F. (2d) 735 (1929) ; and United States v. Cox, 24 F. (2d) 944 (1928).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
to receive the same interpretation if the intention of Congress is to be
carried out.2 1 The generous policy underlying the National Service Life
Insurance Act calls for a breadth of interpretation of equal scope in
the absence of clear limitation on the point. Even if such were not the
case, there are equities in favor of a decision like the instant one for
it is common knowledge that little was done to give servicemen a com-
plete education in the basic principles governing the choice of a beneficiary
or the consequences of making an improper choice. To deny relief to a
designated beneficiary who may have provided the sentimental, if not the
substantial, side of the parent-child relationship in order to favor a rel-
ative, would indeed place the law in the position of vouching for the
adage that "blood is thicker than water".
R. W. BEART.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRocEss OF LAw-WHETHER THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT GUARANTEES AN AcCusED PERSON THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE AS
His ATTORNEY ONE NOT ADMITTED TO LOCAL PRACTICE-The defendants in
United States v. Bergamo,' residents of New Jersey, were seized by the
police while in Pennsylvania where they had gone to deliver counterfeit
gasoline and sugar ration stamps. They were indicated for a federal
offense' and were arraigned in a district court sitting in the latter state.
Defendants retained a New Jersey lawyer in good standing in his own
state to represent them. As the lawyer had not been admitted in the
particular district court, a member of the local bar was also retained as
resident associate counsel, 3 but the understanding was that the New
Jersey lawyer should be admitted specially4 and would actively conduct
the defense. When the case was reached for trial, the district judge,
who happened also to be a resident of New Jersey and who seemingly
felt that some reflection might be cast by reason of the appearance of
New Jersey lawyers before him, announced that the defendants' principal
counsel and all like him, would not be permitted to appear in behalf of
their clients.' The resident counsel moved for a continuance because of
21 Willis v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 169 U. S. 295, 18 S. Ct. 347, 42 L. Ed.
752 (1898).
1 154 F. (2d) 31 (1946).
2 18 U. S. C. A. § 72.
3 Rule 3 of the U. S. Dist. Ct. for the Middle Dist. of Pa. provides: "Ally attor-
ney . . . who is not a resident . . . shall in each proceeding in which he appears
have associate counsel, resident of and maintaining an office in the District .... "
4 Rule 2, ibid., provides: "Attorneys and counselors admitted to practice before
other courts, who do not possess the full qualifications required by the foregoing
rule, may be admitted specially for the purpose of a particular case."
5 The attorney remained in the courtroom but took no part in the proceedings
and, during the later stages became ill and was obliged to absent himself.
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his lack of familiarity with the case, but the motion was denied. After
a trial in which the resident counsel was said to have cross-examined in a
very competent fashion, the defendants were convicted. On appeal, a
contention by the defendants that they had been denied their constitu-
tional right to be represented by counsel of their choice6 was sustained
when the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial, pointing out that while the district
court might have some discretion respecting the special admission of
counsel in civil cases, no such discretion was permitted in criminal cases.
There does not appear to be any case presenting the exact problem
involved in the instant case, although there is dictum in earlier cases
which tends to point in the direction of such a holding. 7  It has even
been stated that the "right to have the assistance of counsel is too funda-
mental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to
the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." But there is also no
question but what the right cannot be insisted upon to the point where,
or in a manner which, to do so would obstruct orderly procedure of the
courts and prevent them from an exercise of their inherent powers.9
In view of the fact, then, that the defendants in the instant case had
been given advance notice that their chosen attorney would not be per-
mitted to appear in their behalf' ° and had ample opportunity to choose
another from an adequate number of competent members of the local
bar, the trial court's ruling would seem sound.
The determination that the rule regarding special admission of at-
6 While U. S. Const., Amend. 6, merely states that the accused shall "have the
assistance of counsel," it has been held to intimate the right to counsel of his own
selection: Smith v. United States, 53 App. D. C. 53, 288 F. 259 (1923).
7 In Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55. 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527
(1932), it was indicated that the accused should be granted an opportunity to select
his own counsel before the court makes an appointment. Accord: Walker v. State,
194 Ga. 727, 22 S. E. (2d) 462 (1942) ; People v. Shiffman, 350 Ill. 243, 182 N. E.
760 (1932). If counsel is appointed, the court must see to it that defendants with
possible adverse interests are represented by separate attorneys: Glasser v. United
States, 315 U. S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). It is also error, according
to People v. Price, 262 N. Y. 410, 187 N. E. 298 (1933), to appoint counsel prior to
the time when the attorney selected by the defendant has withdrawn his appear-
ance. The right of free choice in civil cases, but not involving choice of non-
resident counsel, is discussed in In re Mandell, 69 F. (2d) 830 (1934), and Kerling
v. G. W. Van Dusen & Co., 109 Minn. 481, 124 N. W. 235 (1910).
8 Murphy, J., in Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 at 76, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86
L. Ed. 680 at 702.
9 Smith v. United States, 53 App. D. C. 53, 288 F. 259 (1923). The trial court
there delayed starting the trial a seasonable amount of time because of the absence
of defendant's chosen attorney, then appointed counsel. The case had proceeded to
the point where a jury had been impanelled and a witness sworn before defendant's
original attorney arrived. Held: no error, because defendant was responsible for
the situation, in absence of showing of actual prejudice.
lo154 F. (2d) 31 at 33.
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torneys to practice had to yield to the defendants' right to counsel of
their own choice also involves an issue to which the Circuit Court of
Appeals appears to have given very little consideration. The question
might be restated to be one as to whether or not there are any limits
to the accused person's choice. He undoubtedly may reject the offer
of counsel and act as his own attorney, if his waiver is intelligently
made." Unquestionably, his selection of a regularly admitted local at-
torney would be honored,'12 may even be ordered, if he was financially able
to provide for his own defense.' When he seeks to retain an outside at-
torney, however, his desire comes into conflict with the well established
proposition that not every one may act as an attorney at law for an-
other, the practice being limited to those who have been duly licensed
and admitted to practice. Certainly no court NWould regard itself bound
to listen to a chosen advocate whose license had been forfeited for mis-
conduct despite the fact that he might possess the skill and training of
the most competent lawyer. Can the accused, then, force an attorney
upon a court merely because he happens to be in good standing else-
where? Admitted that courts will generally grant special license for
a particular case in a spirit of comity, the intrinsic problem is whether
it can be forced to do so. Granted that a constitutional right would be
superior to any mere rule of court, especially if the latter was in con-
flict with the former, 14 is the accused person's right to counsel so broad
as the court in the instant case would indicate it to be?
In common-law days, the accused possessed no such right whatever
and counsel was permitted to speak in his behalf only if some question of
law was involved.' 5 Any present assurance of aid of counsel, then, is to
be found simply because of constitutional or statutory provisions. Viewed
from the angle of state practice, the case of Betts v. Brady6 would in-
dicate that the constitutional right to assistance of counsel is far from an
absolute one nor is it one which must be accorded in all criminal cases,
for it was there held unnecessary to appoint counsel for an indigent
defendant in a non-capital felony case in the absence of local constitu-
tional or statutory mandate. Not even the Fourteenth Amendment,
with its requirement of due process, was deemed enough to make the
assistance of counsel compulsory.
"1 United States v. Mitchell, 137 F. (2d) 1006 (1943), and 138 F. (2d) 831 (1943).
12 People v. Price, 262 N. Y. 410, 187 N. E. 298 (1933).
13 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 730; State v. Steelman, 318 Mo.
628, 300 S. W. 743 (1927).
'4 People v. Davis, 357 Ill. 396, 192 N. E. 210 (1934).
'5 Sir William Withipole's Case, Cro. Car. 147, 79 Eng. Rep. 730 (1628).
16316 U. S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942), noted in 21 CMCAGO-KENT
LAW RLviEw 107.
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It is true that the Federal constitution grants the right to have the
aid of counsel in "all criminal cases," but the term "counsel" as used
therein can be understood to have only one meaning, i. e. a duly licensed
and admitted attorney at law. It was so understood at the time the con-
stitution was adopted 1 7 and its meaning has not changed.1 8 The right
of the judiciary to select its own officers is equally well understood, even
to the point where admission to practice before the United States Supreme
Court does not confer the right to practice in the lower federal tribunals
or before the state courts.19 As an Illinois court once expressed the idea,
"It would be strange, indeed, if the court can control its own court room,
and even its own janitor, but that it is not within its power to inquire
into the ability of the persons who assist in the administration of justice
as its officers."20 The rule involved in the instant case, therefore, seems
to be perfectly consistent not only with the constitutional rights of the
accused but also with generally accepted tenets regarding admission to
practice in that it placed a discretion, by saying non-resident attorneys
"may be admitted," where it properly belonged, that is in the court
where the practice was to occur.
Without doubt, a denial of the right to appear as counsel for an
accused person on purely arbitrary grounds would violate constitutional
rights, for it has been said that the power to admit "is not an arbitrary
and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the court, or from
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility . . . it is the duty of the
court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion." 2
It does not appear in the instant case, however, that the action of the
trial judge was reversed for an abuse of judicial discretion. Instead,
the Circuit Court of Appeals, giving a mandatory effect to the rule, said
that the circumstances "required" 'that the nonresident attorney be ad-
mitted specially, although the only circumstance of importance seemed
to be that such attorney happened to be the one of defendants' choice.
Carrying this interpretation to a logical conclusion, a district court might
find itself obliged to permit repeated appearances of a non-resident at-
torney, if he was chosen by a succession of persons charged with crime,
even though it might not be willing to grant him a general license.
17 3 BI. Com. 26 indicates that no man "can practice as an attorney in any of
those courts but such as is admitted and sworn an attorney of that particular
court."
18 7 C. J. S., Attorney and Client, § 6, p. 711, states: "Attorneys being officers of
the court, the power to admit applicants to practice law is judicial and not legisla-
tive, and is vested in the courts only."
19 In re Day, 181 Ill. 73. 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A. 519 (1899). See also 1 Pollock
& 'Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, p. 211 et seq.
20 In re Day, 181 Ill. 73 at 95, 54 N. E. 646 at 652.
21 7 C. J. S., Attorney and Client, § 6, p. 711.
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Perhaps the only alternative would be to adopt the idea expressed
in the civil case of In re Mandel 2 2 wherein a local rule forbade a trustee
in bankruptcy from selecting counsel from among those interested in the
case. The court there said: "Only in the rarest cases should the trus-
tee be deprived of the privilege of selecting his own counsel, and reasons
which make it for the best interest of the estate the court select the at-
torney over the trustee's objection should appear in the record."23  If
that idea were adopted, the defendant's supposed constitutional right to an
attorney of his own choice, even one from outside the district, might be
accommodated in the average case but still leave the trial court some dis-
cretion in the matter if the reasons impelling a denial thereof were suf-
ficiently meritorious to warrant spreading the same on the public records.
N. MCLEAN.
CRIMINAL LAw-SuccEssrVE OFFENSE AND HABITUAL CRIMINALS-
WHETHER OR NOT A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR CRIME WITHOUT THE STATE
MAY BE USED TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION UNDER THE ILLINOIS HABITUAL
CRIMINAL ACT-A problem of first impression was presented to the
Illinois Supreme Court in the recent case of People v. Poppe.1 The
defendant there was found guilty of burglary and, having been previ-
ously convicted of an offense within the purview of the Habitual
Criminal Act,2 was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment in the
penitentiary under a provision which directs that second offenders
shall be punished for the full term permitted for the last conviction.'
The defendant took the ease to the Supreme Court on error,4 contending
that the conviction under the Habitual Criminal Act could not be
sustained since the previous offense of burglary had occurred in Ohio
and the Illinois statute did not expressly provide that convictions
without the state should be considered, as do similar statutes in many
other states.5  The Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the sentence
2269 F. (2d) 830 (1934).
23 60 F. (2d) 830 at 831. Italics added.
1 394 111. 216, 68 N. E. (2d) 254 (1946).
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 602. The second conviction need not be for the
same offense as the prior one, but must be for one of the crimes enumerated in the
statute: Kelly v. People. 115 Ill. 583, 4 N. E. 644 (1886).
3 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 84, fixes the punishment for burglary at imprisonment for any
term of years not less than one year or for life. A second conviction, pursuant to
the Habitual Criminal Act, would carry a life sentence.
4 Direct review is authorized by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 780 .
5 See, for example. Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, § 9931, which provides: "Every
person who, after having been convicted in this state of a felony or an attempt to
commit a felony, or under the laws of any other state or country . . . shall be
punished as follows .. " Italics added.
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of the lower court, holding that convictions without the state were
within the contemplation of the Illinois statute.
Although a search of the authorities reveals that many states have
statutes providing for enhanced punishment of subsequent offenders and
discloses that these acts have been the targets of repeated attacks on con-
stitutional and other grounds, it yields few decisions which bear directly
on the problem involved in the instant case.' About the turn of the
present century, it had been definitely established that a statute increas-
ing the punishment for successive crimes is not unconstitutional as
imposing a penalty for crimes committed without the jurisdiction.7 But
long before that decision the principle seems to have been established
that a statute may impose an aggrevated penalty on repeated offenders,
so long as it expressly provides that crimes committed without the
state be considered to determine the amount of punishment." That a
statute of this nature merely punishes more severely for the new crime
because of the prior offenses has been generally regarded as proper by
the courts.' Nor does the enumeration of specific felonies in such a stat-
ute violate due process requirements or operate to deny equal protection
of the laws, since such classification, although it results in discrimination,
has been held to be a proper matter for legislative discretion. 10 One
general requirement, however, seems to be that the foreign conviction
must be for such conduct as would amount to a felony under the laws of
the forum if it had been committed therein.
1
'
Where the statute expressly provides that prior convictions, whether
within or without the state, shall be considered, the present problem is
not likely to arise, although objections to being charged with a foreign
conviction have been raised on a variety of grounds such as, for example,
the claim that the offense had been pardoned, 12 that the sentence had
6 See cases collection in annotations to People v. Gowasky, 244 N. Y. 451, 155
N. E. 737 (1927), in 58 A. L. R. 9; People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 235 N. W. 245
(1931), in 82 A. L. R. 341; People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. (2d) 508, 71 P. (2d) 214 (1937),
in 116 A. L. R. 205; Re Jerry, 294 Mich. 689, 293 N. W. 909 (1940), in 132 A. L. R.
89; People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N. Y. 132, 38 N. E. (2d) 468 (1941),
in 139 A. L. R. 667.
7 McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 21 S. Ct. 389, 45 L. Ed. 542 (1901).
s See reference to N. Y. Sess. Laws 1823, p. 179, § 6, in People v. Caesar, 1 Parker
Cr. R. (N. Y.) 645 at 648 (1855).
9 People v. Atkinson, 376 Ill. 623, 35 N. E. (2d) 58 (1941) ; State v. Findling, 123
Minn. 413, 144 N. W. 142, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 449 (1913) ; State v. Moore, 121 Mo.
514, 26 S. W. 345, 42 Am. St. Rep. 542 (1894), affirmed in 159 U. S. 673, 16 9. Ct.
179, 40 L. Ed. 301 (1895).
10 People v. Lawrence, 390 Ill. 499, 61 N. E. (2d) 361 (1945).
1:124 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 1960(d).
12 Pardon is apt not to relieve a defendant from the additional penalty: People
v. Biggs, 9 Cal. (2d) 508, 71 P. (2d) 214, 116 A. L. R. 205 (1937), noted in 16
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been suspended,' 3 or that the prior offense was not identical in all of its
elements with one punishable as a felony in the prosecuting state.14 Where
the statute does not contain such an express provision, judicial ruling
on the problem herein considered is likely to be required.1" As may be
expected, the cases are not in accord as to the effect to be given such a
statute. The court in the instant case concludes that the weight of
authority permits the inclusion of foreign convictions in a prosecution
under an habitual criminal act, and relies on decisions interpreting both
the Minnesota and the Illinois types of habitual criminal statutes. Since
the contention is not that a conviction in another state may not under
any circumstances be considered, but that it shall not be charged against
a defendant unless the statute expressly so provides, only the authorities
from states with statutes similar to the Illinois act need be examined.
Of the cases cited in support of the court's position, only two have
been found to be directly in point. One of the cases relied upon is that
of Fennen v. Commonwealth. 6 There, an indictment had been returned
against the defendant charging him with the commission of a felony
and alleging that he had been twice previously convicted in Ohio, a sister
state. The life sentence of the lower court was sustained, but the case
is no authority for the proposition under examination for the defend-
ant's objections went to the sufficiency of the language of the indictment
in that the laws of Ohio were not pleaded haec verba. No point was made
as to the admission of the Ohio convictions as such, doubtless for the
very good reason, not noticed by the Illinois court in the instant case,
that the Kentucky statute was not similar to the Illinois act but expressly
provided that convictions whether within or without the state might be
considered. 1 7 In the Texas case of Johnston v. State,' a conviction under
an habitual criminal statute similar to that of Illinois was upheld not-
withstanding the fact that the prior convictions had taken place in Okla-
13 A defendant has been held properly convicted as a second offender despite the
fact that sentence on the previous conviction was suspended: People v. Wilson, 12
N. Y. S. (2d) 395, 257 App. Div. 893 (1939), affirmed in 281 N. Y. 712, 23 N. E.
(2d) 542 (1939).
14 Substantial similarity in the offenses seems to be sufficient: State v. Young,
345 Mo. 407, 1.33 S. W. (2d) 404 (1939).
15 The Illinois statute has been in force since 1883; Laws 1883, p. 76. The issue
was raised once before in People v. Stack, 391 Ill. 15, 62 N. E. (2d) 807 (1945),
but as the habitual criminal count was nolle prossed there was no decision thereon.
16240 Ky. 530, 42 S. W. (2d) 744 (1931).
17 Carroll's Ky. Stat. 1930, § 1130, provides: "Every person convicted a second
time of felony, the punishment of which is confinement in the penitentiary, shall be
confined in the penitentiary not less than double the time of the first conviction . . .
Judgment in such cases shall not be given for the increased penalty, unless the jury
shall find, from the record and other competent evidence, the fact of former con-
victions for felony committed by the prisoner, in or out of this state."
18 130 Tex. Cr. 524, 95 S. W. (2d) 439 (1936).
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homa. That result was foreshadowed by a decision of the Texas court,
rendered two years earlier, when it had permitted the inclusion of a
conviction in a federal court located within the state. 9 A case not men-
tioned in the opinion in the instant case, but one supporting the outcome,
is that of Wiese v. State.2" A Nebraska statute there concerned provided
that for a second or subsequent offense of chicken-stealing the offender
should be deemed to be guilty of a felony and should be punished ac-
cordingly. It was held that upon conviction for the offense of chicken-
stealing, an increase in the penalty could be imposed under the statute
because of a prior conviction for a similar offense in Iowa.
Opposed to the foregoing cases are decisions from several other re-
spectable jurisdiction. In the early case of People v. Caesar,2' it was
held that the defendant could not be punished for petit larceny as a
second offender in New York, when the first larceny had been committed
in Massachusetts, since the particular statute was silent with reference
to offenses committed without the state. The court said that the penal
statutes of each state must be construed to be applicable only to offenses
committed within its own borders unless it affirmatively appear that the
intention was otherwise. 22  In Wiedner v. State,"-2 the defendant had had
remitted to him six hundred days of a prison sentence in the New Jersey
state prison. Subsequently, he was again committed to the state prison
by a federal district court sitting within the state for a crime against
the federal government. At the expiration of this term, he was taken
to serve out the remitted portion of the state sentence. It was held, how-
ever, that the provisions of the local act did not apply where the second
conviction was obtained in a federal court. Likewise, in Connecticut,
under a statute imposing a heavier penalty upon an offender who had
been twice before convicted, sentenced and imprisoned in a state prison
or penitentiary, it was held that three prior convictions with accompany-
ing detention in a state prison in New York would support a conviction
as an habitual criminal, 24 but a confinement in a federal penitentiary
would not, for the word "state" in the phrase "in a state prison or
penitentiary" was regarded as qualifying the word "penitentiary" as
19 Arnold v. State, 127 Tex. Cr. 89, 74 S. W. (2d) 997 (1934). The court inti-
mated that the exact point had not been passed on before. Apparently its attention
had not been directed to the decisions in Wiedner v. State, 59 N. J. L. 345, 36 A.
102 (1896), and State v. Delmonto, 110 Conn. 298, 147 A. 825 (1929). The Illinois
Supreme Court, since the determination of the instant case and in reliance thereon,
has also achieved the same result: People v. Gavalis, 395 Ill. 409, 70 N. E. (2d)
589 (1947).
20 138 Neb. 685, 294 N. W. 482 (1940).
211 Parker Cr. R. (N. Y.) 645 (1855).
22 Accord: Commonwealth v. Stack. 20 Pa. Dist. R. 599 (1910).
23 59 N. J. L. 345, 36 A. 102 (1896).
24 State v. Riley, 94 Conn. 698, 110 A. 550 (1920).
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well as the word "prison. "25 The court held that since the statute was
highly penal it should be strictly construed, and that it was up to
the legislature to include a reference to a sentence in a federal peni-
tentiary if that was what was intended. Finally, in Lowe v. State,
28
a relatively recent case and one directly in point, the indictment charged
the defendant with possession of burglar tools in Georgia and alleged that
he had been previously convicted of burglary in Tennessee. It was held
that the habitual criminal act of Georgia was not applicable as the prior
conviction and confinement had occurred in another state.
These latter decisions seem to indicate that the majority rule, if one
could be said to exist, is to the effect that a conviction without the
state may not be made the basis for the application of the habitual crim-
inal statute unless the same so expressly provides. Bearing in mind that
the primary rule for the interpretation of a penal statute is that it is
to be strictly construed in favor of the accused,27 certain decisions prior
to a recent amendment of the Illinois statute28 suggest that such a con-
struction has previously prevailed in this state. Thus in one case the
defendant was found guilty of burglary and, having a prior conviction
of larceny of a motor vehicle against him, 29 he was sentenced as an
habitual criminal. It was held that the conviction for larceny of a motor
vehicle was not the same as one for grand larceny within the meaning
of the habitual criminal statute."0 In another case, that of People v.
Sarosiek,31 it was held that a larceny from the person,32 in the absence
of a finding that the value of the property so taken exceeded $15, was
not a grand larceny 33 within the purview of the act, 4 despite the fact that
a larceny from the person is to be treated as the same as grand larceny
25 State v. Delmonto, 110 Conn. 298, 147 A. 825 (1929).
2650 Ga. App. 369, 178 S. E. 203 (1935), conforming to answer to a question
certified in 179 Ga. 742, 177 S. E. 240 (1934).
27 People v. Lund, 382 Ill. 213, 46 N. E. (2d) 929 (1943).
28 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 573; I. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 602. The amendment
merely added to the list of offenses coming within the purview of the Habitual
Criminal Act.
29 That conduct constitutes a separate and specific crime according to Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 388a.
30 People v. Parker, 356 Ill. 301, 1.90 N. E. 358 (1934). But an election to indict
the defendant for grand larceny brings the prior conviction within the purview of
the act, according to People v. Crane, 356 Ill. 276, 190 N. E. 355 (1934), even
though the property stolen consists of an automobile.
31375 Ill. 631, 32 N. E. (2d) 311 (1941).
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 387.
33 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 389. The term "grand larceny" is not expressly defined by
statute, but the courts have interpreted it to mean the theft of property of more
than $15 in value, thereby distinguishing it from petty larceny on the basis of
punishment.
34 It is now enumerated as one of the habitual offenses by reason of an amend-
ment added in 1941: Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 573.
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for purpose of punishment. 5  It would seem, then, that the court in the
instant case has departed from its own standards in failing to apply the
strict type of construction it has heretofore used.
There is, of course, a subsidiary rule that directs that a statute is
to be construed so as to give effect to the obvious intention of the legis-
lature.36  The court in the instant case said it saw an intention on the
part of the legislature to include a foreign conviction because of the
statutory direction that a "duly authenticated" copy of the record of a
former conviction and judgment of any court of record should serve
as prima facie evidence of such conviction." It pointed out that a tran-
script of a judgment of a court within the state need only be certified
to be admissible in evidence, 3 hence the use of an authenticated copy
could refer only to an out-of-state conviction. However persuasive this
argument may be, it would appear, in the light of decisions from other
jurisdictions and by an application of the rule of strict construction,
that the present decision is at least questionable. As to the propriety of
the result, however, there is no dispute. It is fitting that a wrongdoer
who persists in his criminal conduct, whether at home or abroad, should
be socially isolated by confinement, the period of which ought to be
determined by the fact of his prior convictions and independent of the
place where they may have been obtained. But this should be a matter
for the legislature, which can express its views on the question in language
admitting of but one meaning.
J. E. GALT.
INFANTS-ACTIONS-WHETHER OR NOT A CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS
IN FAvoR OP A CHILD FOR PRENATAL INJURIES INFLICTED UPON IT-The
case of Bonbrest v. Kotz involved a re-appraisal of the question as to
whether or not an infant, after its birth, might maintain a suit against
the attending physician, upon a cause of action predicated on malpractice,
for injuries sustained in the process of removal from the mother's womb.
A motion for summary judgment, based upon the ground that the com-
plaint failed to state a cause of action on behalf of the infant, was there
denied when the United States District Court concluded that the child,
being viable at the time the injury was inflicted, was sufficiently a per-
son to have a standing in court and to possess the rights which attend
on all human beings, especially if the child survived to be born alive.
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 389.
36 Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 159, 40 S. Ct. 241, 64 L. Ed. 507
(1920).
37 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 603.
38 Ibid., Ch. 51, § 13.
165 F. Supp. 138 (194).
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The decision was admittedly one without precedent either in the
common law or in the jurisdiction of its determination, in fact was di-
rectly opposed to practically all recorded American cases dealing with
the point,2 and proceeded upon the concept that judges were free to mold
the common law to meet changing conditions or to keep pace with prog-
ress in the other sciences. The infection of that bold disregard for
fundamental doctrines such as was demonstrated recently in the case of
.Daily v. Parker' would, therefore, seem to be spreading through the fed-
eral judiciary. Dean Pound's prophesy that the law was "entering
upon a new period of growth" 4 comes closer to accomplished fact.
Further novelty is projected into the case, however, by the idea
that viability rather than birth or conception is to be deemed the test
of human existence for the purpose of deciding whether the infant is a
person capable of claiming human rights with their corresponding duties.
The problem is not one of whether the mother can recover for injuries
sustained by her at the time of the child's birth,5 but whether the child
can recover in his own right.6 Only one similar case, a Canadian de-
cision,7 has reached the same result and there it was achieved upon the
ground that (1) as the wrongful act might also constitute a crime against
the unborn child it was difficult to see why its separate existence could
not be recognized for purpose of redressing a tort, but (2) more likely
because the court felt that the recovery by the parents would leave a
residuum of injury for which compensation could not be had save at the
suit of the child. The tenor of the reasoning underlying the decision is
best exemplified by a quotation from the opinion. The court there said:
"If a right of action be denied to the child it will be compelled, without
any fault on its part, to go through life carrying the seal of another's
2 See cases listed by the court, 65 F. Supp. 138 at 139, notes 1 to 4 inclusive. The
court could have added Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N. E. (2d) 446
(1939), noted in 27 Ill. B. J. 348, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1016; Ryan v. Public Service
Co-ordinated Transport, 18 N. J. Misc. 429, 14 A. (2d) 52 (1940) ; In re Robert's
Estate, 286 N. Y. S. 467 (1936) ; Lewis v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 177 S. W. (2d)
(Tex. Civ. App.) 350 (1943). The only cases contra, from courts of inferior status,
are Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 629, 92 P. (2d) 678 (1939), predicated
upon a provision of the California code, and Kine v. Zuckerman, 4-Pa. D. & C. 227,
97 A. L. R. 1525 (1939).
3 152 F. (2d) 174 (1945), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RE vIEw 90.
4 Pound, "The Spirit of the Common Law" (Marshall, Jones & Co., Boston, 1921).
p. 181.
5 See, for example, Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933).
6 Recovery has been denied upon the theory that in the absence of contract with
the child there can be no duty owed to it: Nugent v. Brooklyn Hts. R. Co., 154
App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. S. 367 (1913) ; Walker v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 28 Irish
L. R. 69 (1891). Expanding use of the doctrine of third-party beneficiary contracts
would nullify the argument underlying such cases.
7 Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 1933 Can. Sup. 456, 4 Dom. L. R. 337 (1933).
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fault and bearing a very heavy burden of infirmity and inconvenience
without any compensation therefor. "8
Whatever might have been the view of the civil law,9 it is undoubtedly
true that the common law regarded a child en ventre sa mere, from the
moment of conception rather that that of viability, 10 as a person capable
of inheriting property" so long as the child was subsequently born alive.12
The importance of such fictionalizing of personality can well be under-
stood in the light of the then social significance of real property owner-
ship and the feudal need for family perpetuation. At a time when much
land was held under fee tail tenure, fictions of that character would be
apt to be developed to prevent lapse of estates1' but would be carried
no farther than the need required. It is not remarkable, therefore,
that the common law went no further than it did.
It is not so clear, however, that the unborn child was a person
within the contemplation of the criminal law, Blackstone to the contrary
notwithstanding. 4 More modern research has indicated that in common-
law days such was not the case, 5 and abortion is generally treated as
criminal today not because of any common-law doctrines but by reason
of statutory prohibition.'0 There is, then, considerable uncertainty in
the supposed analogy between tort law and criminal law used to support
the instant case," and expressed as a qualified "if" underlying the
8 1933 Can. Sup. 456 at 464. 4 Dor. L. R. 337 at 345.
9 Dig. Just., lib. 1. tit. 5, § 26, does declare: "Q0t in utero gsnt, in toto paenc
iure civilli intelligenfur in. rerum natura esse." But it should be noted that the
statement is qualified by the adverb "almost" and talks of the unborn as "things"
rather than as "persons."
10 There is a medical distinction between an embryo, or foetus in its earliest
stages of development, and a viable foetus, or one which has reached such a stage
of development that it can live outside of the uterus: Encyclo. Americana, Vol. 10,
p. 283.
11 1 B1. Com., p. 130. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 164.
12Smith v. Fox. .53 Ont. L. R. 54, 3 Dom. L. R. 785 (1923); Doe v. Clarke. 2 H.
Bl. 399. 126 Eng. Rep. 617 (1795) ; Goodale v. Gawthorne, 2 S. & Giff. 375, 65 Eng.
Rep. 443 (1854).
'a Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital, 184 Ii1. 359, 56 N. B. 638 (1900).
14 It is stated, in 1 BI. Com.. p. 129, to be the law: "For if a woman is quick
with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it in her womb: or if any one beat
her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this,
though not murder, was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter."
15Rex v. Brain, 6 Car. & P. 349. 172 Eng. Rep. 1272 (1834). But see Rex v.
Senior, 1 Mood. 346, 168 Eng. Rep. 1298 (1832), as to criminal responsibility for
injury inflicted at time of birth.
16 See, for example, 43 Geo. III, c. 58; II1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 3.
' Judge McGuire, 65 F. Supp. 138 at 140, poses the query: "Why a 'part' of the
mother under the law of negligence and a separate entity and person in that of. . .
crime?" The answer would seem to be that they are not to be so regarded in the
absence of a statute so declaring.
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comparable Canadian decision.' 8 When it is recalled that a tort is a
private wrong whereas a crime involves conduct offensive to the public
generally, there is still further reason for observing distinctions between
them which distinctions become clouded by drawing attempted analogies
such as was done in the instant case.
It must be said, then, that the law, as presently constituted, does not
support the holding in the instant case. Yet it is regrettable that no
remedy has been provided for situations like the one here involved, for
professional men should be penalized for their incompetence. A way out
has been indicated in California, for the code of that state declares that
a child "conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person,
so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent
birth."' 9  That provision was interpreted, in Scott v. McPheeters,'20 to
be sufficiently broad to permit suit, at the instance of the child, to re-
cover for prenatal injuries inflicted upon it. Similar legislation enacted
elsewhere should prove sufficient to create a cause of action in favor of
the infant without the necessity of requiring judges to go beyond their
province in devising remedies to fit hard cases. If such laws existed,
it would be unnecessary to attempt distinctions between a child conceived
and one that had reached the stage of viability, thereby eliminating some
of the difficulty implicit in establishing a case like the instant one.
It would not, however, obviate other difficulties in proving that the
prenatal injury was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence
or lack of skill, a factor which has led some courts to repudiate attempts
to maintain such actions. 21 But difficulty in making proof, or the fact
that damages may be deemed too remote to permit recovery, are scarcely
reasons for denying the existence of a cause of action. Such things
should merely serve to challenge the law and lawyers to keep pace with
developments in other fields.
E. W. JACKSON.
is In Montreal Tramways v. Leveille. 1933 Can. Sup. 456 at 464. 4 Dom. L. R. 337
at 344, the court notes: "... if the law recognizes the separate existence of the
unborn child sufficiently to punish the crime, it is difficult to see why it should not
also its separate existence for the purpose of redressing the tort." Italics added.
19 Deering, Cal. Civil Code, § 29.
2033 Cal. App. (2d) 629, 92 P. (2d) 678 (1939).
21 See note, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 549. In Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227, 97
A. L. R. 1525 (1936), the court relied upon the unique theory that the defendant's
neglect set in motion a harmful force which did not culminate in injury until the
moment of birth. While that rationale was adopted to defeat the argument that
the child was not in esse at the time of the wrong, hence could not sue, it might
prove helpful in establishing a prima facie case. Since imbecility, paralysis, loss of
function and the like are not normal incidents to natural birth under competent
handling of delivery, the existence thereof might be regarded as a type of res ipsa
loquitur.
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INJUNCTION-SUBJECTS OF PROTECTION AND RELIEF-WHETHER OF
NOT CITIZEN AcquITTED ON CRIMINAL CHARGE CAN COMPEL SURRENDER
OR DESTRUCTION OF FINGERPRINTS AND OTHER IDENTIFYING RECORDS TAKEN
BY POLICE AT TIME OF ARREST-In the case of State ex rel. Mavity v.
Tyndall1 the Indiana Supreme Court had occasion to construe the effect of
a local statute2 which had created a State Bureau of Identification and
had provided for the securing, by local police, of photographs, finger-
prints and the like of persons convicted of certain crimes or who were
well-known and habitual criminals. The statute required that such records
be retained to compose an identification system integrated with those of
other states and the one maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. The statute was silent, however, as to what should be done with
the records in the event the accused had no previous criminal record
and was acquitted upon a proper hearing. According to that case, the
relator, who had no criminal record except for one traffic violation, was
arrested for gaming and keeping a gaming device. Following customary
police practice, but against his will, relator's fingerprints were taken, he
was photographed, a specimen signature was obtained, and certain de-
scriptive material was added. Three sets of these records were made;
one being retained at the local police headquarters, one being sent to the
state police central office, and the third filed with the federal bureau. The
criminal charges were subsequently dismissed. When relator sought the
return of these records, his request was refused. He then sought to man-
damus the local officials to compel surrender or destruction of the rec-
ords claiming that the exhibition thereof in a rogue's gallery invaded his
right of privacy. He conceded that the police had the right to secure
the records in the first instance for purpose of identification, to arrange
for his safekeeping pending trial or to aid in his recapture in case of
escape, but claimed such purposes were spent after his acquittal. Upon
finding that relator's photograph had been placed in a rogue's gallery
and had been viewed by members of the public attempting to identify
persons accused of committing other crimes, the Indiana Supreme Court
concluded that relator's right of privacy had been invaded and, as a con-
sequence, it reversed a judgment sustaining a demurrer to his complaint.
It did indicate, however, that the retention of fingerprint records alone
would ordinarily give rise to no unfavorable publicity as such records
could be read only by experts.
Cases in point, either from Indiana or from other jurisdictions, are
comparatively rare. The earlier decisions denied relief, although on
1 - Ind. -, 66 N. E. (2d) 755 (1946).
2 Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933, § 47-846 et seq. See also Acts 1945, Ch. 344, §§ 12-14.
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grounds unconnected with any right of privacy. More recent cases,
however, disclose a tendency to provide a remedy when an innocent per-
son's right of privacy has been wrongfully invaded as by taking and
distributing identification records after arrest and before trial. The
first Indiana case, that of State ex rel. Burns v. Clausmier, for example,
was one in which the arrested person, after his discharge, sought to re-
cover damages on a sheriff's bond for the taking of his photograph while
in custody on a charge of forgery. The court held that, as there was no
official duty on the part of the sheriff to take photographs for identifi-
cation records and to publish them before conviction, there could be no
recovery on the official bond. The question of whether or not the sheriff
could have been held personally liable, as for the publication of a libel,
was not before the court and was not decided. With the passage of the
Indiana statute construed for the first time in the instant case, a different
result for similar litigation in that state might now well be obtained.
Early cases in New York also denied relief to persons seeking the
return or destruction of identification records. In Owen v. Partridge,
Police Commissioner,4 it was pointed out that "any invasion of one's
right to be let alone can be remedied only by a statutory enactment di-
rected against the particular case.", An innocent man, in another case,
whose prison records were still on file after he had been acquitted of
first degree murder upon appeal, was also referred to the legislature.6
Relief was likewise denied, in Gow v. Binghamn,7 on the ground that man-
damus was an improper remedy, although the court recognized that a
gross injustice had been committed in obtaining the identification records
prior to even a preliminary hearing.
In the Maryland case of Downs v. Swann,' the accused person
sought to obtain an injunction against the police officials but failed to
allege that the defendants were improperly planning to place his pic-
ture, after acquittal, in an existing rogue's gallery. Upon police denial
that it was their practice to so use such photographs unless the offender
was convicted or escaped custody, injunctive relief was denied. The court
did state, however, that police officers "have no right to needlessly or
wantonly injure in any respect persons whom they are called upon in
the course of their duty to arrest or detain, and for the infliction of any
such injury they would be liable, to the injured person, in the same manner
3 154 Ind. 599, 57 N. E. 541 (1900).
4 40 Misc. 415, 82 N. Y. S. 248 (1903).
540 Misc. 415 at 421, 82 N. Y. S. 248 at 253.
6 In re Molineux, 177 N. Y. 395, 69 N. E. 727, 65 L. R. A. 104 (.1904).
7 57 Misc. 66, 107 N. Y. S. 1011 (1907).
8 111 Md. 53, 73 A. 653 (1909).
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and to the same extent that private individuals would be. "' Much the
same rationale has been followed in Arkansas ° and Washington.',
An attempt to resolve the conflict between the rights of society on
the one hand and those of the individual on the other may be observed
in the New Jersey case of Bartletta v. McFeeley, Commissioner of Public
Safety, 2 where the court refused to enjoin the police exhibition of the
accused's identification records, in the absence of any showing that
malice prompted the police to expose plaintiff to ridicule and disgrace,
on the ground that public safety required the exercise of a certain amount
of discretion on the part of police officials. Shortly thereafter a statute
was adopted requiring the immediate taking of photographs and finger-
prints of a person arrested for an indictable offense as well as the for-
warding of copies thereof to the state Bureau of Identification without
delay.3 As is the case with most such statutes, no mention was made
therein of the right of an accused person, if acquitted, to secure the sur-
render or destruction of these records. Under the circumstances, when
the plaintiff in the case of Fernicola v. Keenan 14 asked for the surrender
of records because he was never indicted, the court again said the ques-
tion of whether or not the records were to be retained was a question to
be decided by the police. In that regard, the chancellor said: "The tak-
ing of the fingerprints in the first place and the whole process of arrest
of a possibly innocent person are a humiliation to which he must submit
for the benefit of society. To the same end, the police are justified in
retaining such records, in certain cases, after an acquittal or a failure
of the Grand Jury to indict . . . On the other hand, when a man
of good repute has a false charge made against him and is cleared of
it, it seems to me that the police should destroy his fingerprints or photo-
graphs or remove them from the Rogues' Gallery. But in the absence of
the statute, discretion in the matter belongs to the police . . It is not
for the court to make decision.15
Two later cases arising in New Jersey brought the problem into
sharper focus. In one of them, that of Jenkins v. McGovern," the ar-
rested person obtained a temporary injunction restraining the sheriff
9 111 Md. 53 at 64, 73 A. 653 at 656.
10 Mabry v. Kettering, 92 Ark. 81, 122 S. W. 115 (1909).
11 Hodgeman v. Olsen, Supt. State Reformatory, 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915).
12107 N. J. Eq. 141, 152 A. 17 (1930), affirmed in 109 N. J. Eq. 241, 156 A. 658
(1931).
13 Rev. Stat. N. J., Vol. II § 53:1-19.
14136 N. J. Eq. 9, 39 A. (2d) 851 (1944).
15 136 N. J. Eq. 9 at 10, 39 A. (2d) 851 at 851-2.
16 136 N. J. Eq. 563, 43 A. (2d) 526 (1945), reversed in - N. J. Eq. -, 45 A.
(2d) 844 (1946).
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from distributing the records, at least before verdict of guilty, to the
federal authorities, to the police of other states, and of other countries.
When the sheriff respected the temporary injunction, and also refrained
from acting as to other arrested persons, he was indicted for failure
to perform his duty. He then sought to prevent the prosecuting officials
from violating his right of privacy by photographing him and disseminat-
ing his identification records prior to conviction. 1" As the court felt
the mere taking of the photograph and fingerprint impressions before
conviction would do no harm, it did not enjoin such action. It did not,
however, have the same opinion about forwarding copies of such records
to other police before a verdict of guilty, and held that so much of the
statute as required the premature dissemination of such records violated
constitutional rights. 8
The improper display of a photograph in a rogue's gallery has also
been denounced in the recent Missouri case of State ex rel. Reed v. Harris"9
where pictures of the accused, who had no record of conviction for felony,
were taken while he was held for a traffic violation. When the accused,
contending that the statute provided merely for the taking and keep-
ing of records of persons convicted of a felony whose convictions had
not been set aside or reversed,' 0 asked for an injunction, the state Bureau
of Identification sought a writ of prohibition to stop the trial judge from
entertaining that proceeding, but did not succeed on much the same
theory as that developed in New Jersey.
Two cases from Louisiana definitely uphold a right of privacy on
the part of an innocent person of such character as to warrant prevent-
ing the retention and distribution of pictures of the accused even though,
in each case, the plaintiff had been arrested on numerous occasions.2 1
The reasoning behind both decisions rests on tlw fact that posting a
picture in a rogue's gallery and sending it to other jurisdictions as a
criminal record constitutes permanent proof of dishonesty which is un-
warranted unless and until a conviction is obtained.
These are the only cases which have reached reviewing courts, but
further material may be gathered by examining the practices of police
officiais in making criminal identification files. The Illinois practice is
17 McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N. J. Eq. 24, 43 A. (2d) 514 (1945).
18 The statute was said to be an improper exercise of the police power in view of
the natural and inalienable rights belonging to every citizen: 137 N. J. Eq. 24 at
46, 43 A. (2d) 514 at 525.
19 348 Mo. 426, 153 S. W. (2d) 834 (1941).
20 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann., Vol. 12, § 4184.
2" Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905), affirmed in 117 La. 708,
42 So. 228 (1906) ; Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905), affirmed
in 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906).
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illustrative. Under the rules and regulations of the state Bureau of Iden-
tification, as well as of local police, it has become standard practice to
secure photographs, fingerprint impressions, Bertillon measurements, and
the like of virtually all persons arrested except those seized for traffic
violations and for juvenile offenders. Such information is kept in local
police and state files, is sent to the federal bureau and is made available
to the police of other states, if requested by them. Complaining wit-
nesses are permitted to view photographs on file when attempting "to
identify offenders. While the Illinois statute provides for keeping these
records, it declares that they are not to be made public except where
necessary in the identification of persons accused of crime or, on trial,
where such persons have been previously imprisoned for prior offenses. 22
Petitions have, therefore, been filed in nisi prius courts seeking the sur-
render or destruction of such identification records where the accused
person has subsequently been discharged and, after due consideration
of the circumstances, such petitions have been allowed or denied on the
merits of each individual case. The matter has, however, been left on
no more firm foundation than that, not only in Illinois but in most of
the states whose statutes are silent on the point. In only ten instances
is there specific treatment on the subject, by requiring either the de-
struction of such records,2" their return to the accused person,24 or their
return upon request, 25 provided the accused person has been acquitted.
The need for adequate identification records to aid in the appre-
hension of criminals is recognized. In the discharge of their general duty
to protect the public, police officials may well have occasion to take photo-
graphs, fingerprints and the like of arrested persons. But the falsely
accused person is likewise in need of protection against the disgrace and
humiliation of being permanently cataloged with felons. Police officials
may exercise their discretion properly and avoid the demand for legis-
lative action. But discretion may be abused, in fact has been so abused
judging by the decided case, so if the legislature has not acted, the
courts should allow relief, as in the instant case, by recognizing an in-
nocent person's right of privacy.
Mrs. D. W. SPINKA
22 Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, §§ 780a-780g.
23 Iowa Code, § 728.8; N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, Ch. 421, § 16-19; R. I. Gen. Laws
1938, Ch. 620, § 7.
24Conn. Gen. Stats. 1941. Ch. 127, §§ 399f-405f; Mason's Minn. Stats. 1941,
§ 626.40; Thompson, N. Y. Cons. Laws, Penal Law, § 516; W. Va. Code Ann. 1943,
§ 1264(1).
25 Mich. Stat. Ann., Vol. II, Ch. 24, § 4.462 and § 4.463; Page's Ohio Gen. Code
Ann., Vol. II, § 1841-18; Vt. Pub. Laws 1933, § 5503.
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INSURANCE--EXTENT OF LOSS AND LIABILITY OF INSURER-WHETHER
oa NOT FACT DEATH OCCURRED IN MILITARY SERVICE PRECLUDES RECoVERY
ON LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CONTAINING MILITARY SERVICE CLAUSE-The
proper construction to be given to a "war clause", excepting liability
in a life insurance policy, was the prime controversy in the recent case
of Hooker v. New York Life Insurance Company.' Plaintiff there sued
as the beneficiary of an insurance policy upon the life of his son who was
killed by an accidental fall from a cliff during training as a United
States Marine on active duty in New Zealand. Controversy as to the
essential facts of his death was more formal than real. Liability for
double indemnity was denied by the insurance company under an ex-
emption clause that limited liability "if the insured's death resulted di-
rectly or indirectly from . . . (d) War or any act incident thereto." Re-
covery on the policy was allowed on the ground that the insured's death
did not "result" from an act incident to war.
While "war" or "service" exemptions are not against public policy.'
for an insurance company has the right to select the risks it will assume,'
the applicability of any given policy exception is not a question of fact
but a matter of construction for the court.' Courts have been found to
adopt the construction most favorable to the insured,' but at that point
accord ceases. Any apparent conflict is due in a great measure to the
difference in the phraseology of the exemption clauses, but the courts,
in many of these cases, adopting an interpretation against the company,
have gone to some length in taking a particular word or phrase in the
military clause, construing the same as ambiguous, then resolving that
ambiguity as meaning activity of a military nature rather than status,
thereby holding the insurer liable.6
Three distinct lines of cases may be discerned in the treatment given
by the courts to what may be generically termed "war" or "military"
exemption clauses. The narrowest class is one in which the status of the
insured, present where the clause typically reads "while in military or
1 66 F. Supp. 313 (1946).
2 Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7 A. L. R.
378 (1919).
' Marks v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 191 Ky. 385, 230 S. W. 540 (1921).
4 Bull v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 141 F. (2d) 456 (1944), cert. den. 323 U. S. 723,
65 S. Ct. 55, 89 L. Ed. 581 (1944).
'Aschenbrenner v. United States Fid. & G. Co., 292 U. S. 80, 54 S. Ct. 590, 78 L.
Ed. 1137 (1934).
6 Bending v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N. E. (2d) 71
(1944).
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naval service", is regarded as the sole criterion.7 Expounding on such
a clause, the Ohio Appellate Court once said, "This language is clear
and unambiguous. There is nothing to construe. The language plainly
makes status of the insured in military or naval service the ground of
exemption from liability." 8 Nor is the duty status of the insured material,
for the same court indicated that one "is in the military service from
the time he takes the oath until he receives his discharge, honorable or
otherwise.' Under this type of exemption, then, the only inquiry is
whether the insured was in military or naval service at the time his
death or disability was incurred ;1o causation or activity is not a factor.1
The nature of the activity in which the insured was engaged at the
time of his death or disability forms the basis of the middleground view-
point adopted by many of the courts, 2 a viewpoint which incorporates
7 The following cases, involving interpretation of the quoted clauses, are illus-
trative: Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7
A. L. R. 378 (1919), ("while in the service in the army or navy . . . in time of
war") ; State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harmon, 72 Ga. App. 117, 33 S. E. (2d) 105 (1945),
("under enrollment in any branch of military or naval service in time of war") ;
Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McLeod, 70 Ga. App. 181, 27 S. E. (2d) 871 (1943),
("while enrolled in military or naval service in time of war") ; Bradshaw v.
Farmers' & Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 107 Kan. 681, 193 P. 332, 11 A. L. R. 1091
(1920), ("shall engage in military or naval service in time of war") ; Ruddock v.
Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N. W. 242 (1920), ("enter or be engaged in
such [military or naval] service") ; Slaughter v. Protective League Life Ins. Co.,
205 Mo. App. 352, 223 S. W. 819 (1920); ("while engaged in military or naval serv-
ice in time of war"); Olson v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. of North Dakota, 48 N. D.
285, 184 N. W. 7 (1921), ("engage in occupation of soldier in time of war").
8 Bending v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N. E. (2d) 71 (1944).
9 74 Ohio App. 182 at 191, 58 N. E. (2d) 71 at 75.
1o Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7 A. L. R.
(1919); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McLeod, 70 Ga. App. 181, 27 S. E. (2d) 871
(1943); Olson v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. of North Dakota, 48 N. D. 285, 184 N. W.
7 (1921) ; Bending v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N. E. (2d)
71 (1944).
11 Bradshaw v. Farmers' & Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 107 Kan. 681, 193 P. 332
(1920).
12 Illustrative of this class are the following cases: Benham v. American Central
Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612, 217 S. W. 462 (1919), ("engaged in military or naval
service in time of war, or in consequence of such service"); Long v. St. Joseph
Life Ins. Co., 225 S. W. (Mo. App.) 106 (1920), affirmed in - Mo. -, 248 S. W.
923 (1923), ("while engaged in any military or naval service in time of war");
Reid v. American Nat. Assur. Co., 204 Mo. App. 643, 218 S. W. 957 (1920), ("engage
in military or naval service in time of war") ; Malone v. State Life Ins. Co., 202
Mo. App. 499, 213 S. W. 877 (1919), ("engage in military or naval service and die
while so engaged") ; Myli v. American Life Ins. Co., 43 N. D. 495, 175 N. W. 631,
11 A. L. R. 1097 (1919), ("while engaged in military or naval service in time of
war") ; Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n v. Davaney, 102 Okla. 302, 226 P. 101 (1924),
("while in the service in the army or navy in time of war") ; Barnett v. Merchants'
Life Ins. Co., 87 Okla. 42, 280 P. 271 (1922), ("engage in military service in time
of war") ; Young v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 204 S. C. 386, 29 S. E.
(2d) 482 (1944), ("while insured is in military or naval service in time of war") ;
West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S. C. 422, 25 S. E. (2d) 475 (1943),
("engaged in military or naval service in time of war") ; Kelly v. Fidelity Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 169 Wis. 274, 172 N. W. 152, 4 A. L. R. 845 (1919), ("engage in mili-
tary service in connection with actual warfare and shall die as result").
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some aspects of status and some of causation.13 When denying operative
effect to an exemption which read "While engaged in any military or
naval service in time of war" in a case where the insured died of natural
causes while home on furlough, a Missouri court once said, "If insured's
mere status of being an enlisted soldier or sailor at the time of his death
is to give effect to the clause and reduce liability, what necessity existed
for saying therein that death must occur while insured is 'engaged' in
any such service.? As applied to military or naval service, the word
'engaged' denotes action or participation in something done in that
service. By putting the word 'engaged' in the exemption clause, the
idea is conveyed that death must occur while insured is participating or
taking part in that service in some way, and not merely during the period
he occupies the status of being a soldier or sailor.' '14
In discussing causation under a similar clause, an Arkansas court
stated, "In the case at bar the insured died from influenza, and the record
shows that this disease was prevalent throughout the United States, and
that soldiers and civilians alike contracted it. The death of the insured,
then, was in no sense caused by performing any military service, or in
consequence of being engaged in military service. '15 The inquiry in
cases of this character, then, includes not only an investigation as to the
insured's status and his activity within that service,"6 but also as to
causal factors17 peculiar to military service18 in order to determine the
effect to be given to the exception.' 9
The third group of cases turns on the causal relation between the
military and naval service, or war, and the death or disability of the
13 See Benham v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612, 217 S. W. 462
(1919), Malone v. State Life Ins. Co., 202 Mo. App. 499, 213 S. W. 877 (1919), and
Kelly v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins..Co., 169 Wis. 274, 172 N. W. 152 (1919), for exam-
ples of the incorporation of this dual nature in the very clause itself.
14 Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co., 225 S. W. (Mo. App.) 106 at 107 (1920).
15 Benham v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612 at 618, 217 S. W. 462
at 463 (1919). Italics added.
16 Whether the insured was on leave or furlough, or was performing military or
naval duties, become matters of consequence.
17 Pertinent questions are: Did the death or disability result from the service?
Was it a disease common to civilian and military alike? Was accidental death, like
an auto accident, common to both civilian and military alike? Was death within
the extra risk occasioned by military or naval service?
is See Kelly v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 169 Wis. 274, 172 N. W. 152 (1919),
where the court limited the exception to a cause "peculiar to military service,"
recovery was allowed for the death of insured when a motorcycle skidded 100 miles
from the front lines in France, insured being a messenger carrying dispatches at
the time.
19 Young v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 204 S. C. 386, 29 S. E. (2d)
282 (1944), permitted recovery for death growing out of an auto accident while on
furlough, on the ground that the exemption was not arbitrary, not status, but was
designed to eliminate the extra risks arising while insured is in military service.
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deceased, 20 which death or disability must result from such service21 or
from war, 22 as in the instant case, before the exemption clause becomes
effective. Thus, as was pointed out in Gorder v. Lincoln National Life
Insurance Compny,23 the cause must have some distinctive character
intimately related to the military service and not be a hazard which
would have been insured against had the soldier remained in civilian
life. Phrases such as "result of" or "in consequence of" are typical
earmarks to be watched for in cases falling in this class. But again, the
"result" reasoning is met in the "activity" decisions. Contributing or
remote cause is insufficient ;24 it must be the direct cause. 25
The exemption clause in the instant case26 is clearly within this
latter division and is so analyzed and discussed by the court. "War or
any act incident thereto" doubtless caused the insured's presence in
New Zealand, even to his participating in training maneuvers, but since
the death of the insured occurred in the course of routine training, it
did not result from an act "incident" to war. Causation doctrines have
been succinctly applied to this type of exemption both by the Massachu-
setts27 and Federal District courts,2 but difficulty has been encountered
in defining the term "war." A recent Iowa case,2" while correctly an-
20 Cases and clauses in this group are: Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp.
620 (1944), ("death resulting from war or any act incident thereto") ; Eggena v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 236 Iowa 262, 18 N. W. (2d) 530 (1945), ("death resulted
directly or indirectly from war or any act incident thereto") ; Stankus v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N. E. (2d) 687 (1942), ("death resulted directly or
Indirectly from war or any act incident thereto") ; Gorder v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins.
Co., 46 N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514, 11 A. L. R. 1080 (1920), ("death in consequence
of such [military or naval] service without the company's permit") ; Smith v.
Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 204 S. C. 193, 28 S. E. (2d) 80 (1944), ("if disability
shall result from military or naval service in time of war").
21 See Gorder v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 46 N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514 (1920),
and Smith v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 204 S. C. 193, 28 S. E. (2d) 808 (1944).
22 Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (1944).
23 46 N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514 (1920).
24 The court in Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (1944), held that
the death of a naval ensign at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, in the course of the
Japanese sneak attack was accidental. Gorder v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 46
N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514 (1920), held that death from pneumonia in Liverpool
within a week of debarkation from a troop transport was not in consequence of
military service.
25 Smith v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 204 S. C. 193, 28 S. E. (2d) 808 (1944).
But see Eggena v. New York Life Ins. Co., 236 Iowa 262, 18 N. W. (2d) 550
(1945), which denied liability for death when a tank in which insured was riding
crashed from a bridge during training activities in the United States, and the com-
ment thereon in Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 F. Supp. 313 at 317 (1946).
26 The clause read: ". . . if the insured's death resulted, directly or indirectly
from . . . (d) war or any act incident thereto." 66 F. Supp. 313 at 314.
27 Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N. E. (2d) 687 (1942).
28 Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 F. Supp. 313 (1946), and Savage v. Sun
Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (1944).
29 Eggena v. New York Life Ins. Co., 236 Iowa 262, 18 N. W. (2d) 530 (1945).
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nouncing the problem under the same exemption to be one of causation,
nevertheless misapplies the doctrine ° for it conceives the term "'war"
to refer to a period of time rather than to a causative factor.
But discussion and attempts at classification yield little of practical
value for the lawyer confronted with a similar exemption clause. Ex-
cellent and exhaustive annotations3' and discussions3 2 serve only to
highlight the confusion. Clauses used by the same insurance company
have been held sufficient to exempt in one case in one jurisdiction 3 but
inoperative in another.3 4  A court of the same state, strongly anti-status
when allowing recovery for death from influenza in the United States,"
nevertheless later denied recovery for death from pneumonia in France
on the basis that status, not activity, was the ground of limitation under
almost identical clauses. 6 Even comparable fact situations have been
productive of different results. For example, the death of a seaman on
a United States destroyer, sunk by a torpedo in the North Atlantic in
1941 was held to be "from war", although prior to any formal declara-
tion,3 7 but death during the bombing of Hawaii by Japanese planes was
treated as not "in time of war. ,,38
Definition and comparison, then, do not resolve the problem, for
there are no well-defined "rules." Objective analysis demonstrates that
the genesis of the problem lies in the need for judicial construction of
"ambiguous" exemption clauses. The obvious remedial action is to re-
examine the verbiage used in the policy, for a concise, clear, complete
exemption should leave no room for ambiguity and consequent construe-
30 See comment in Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 F. Supp. 313 at 317
(1946).
31 See annotation to West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S. C. 422, 25 S. E.(2d) 475 (1943), in 145 A. L. R. 1461 and the general annotation in 137 A. L. R.
1263 bringing earlier World War I notes down to date. The latter annotations may
be found in 15 A. L. R. 1280, 11 A. L. R. 1091, 7 A. L. R. 378, and 4 A. L. R. 845.
32 Two of the better articles on the subject are: Barton, "The War and Aviation
Clauses in Life Insurance Policies," 24 Neb. 264 (1945), and Rively, "War Clauses
in Life Insurance Policies," 46 Dick. L. Rev. 192 (1942). See also comment on
Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (1944), in 25 Bost. U. L. Rev. 289
(1945).
33 Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310 (1919).
34 Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n v. Davaney, 102 Okla. 302, 226 P. 101 (1924).
35 Gorder v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 46 N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514 (1920).
36 Olson v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. of North Dakota, 48 N. D. 285, 184 N. W. 7
(1921).
37 Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N. E. (2d) 687 (1942).
38 Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co.. 57 F. Supp. 620 (1944) ; Rosenau v. Idaho Mut.
Ben. Ass'n, 65 Ida. 408, 145 P. (2d) 227 (1944) ; and West v. Palmetto State Life
Ins. Co., 202 S. C. 422, 25 S. E. (2d) 475 (1943). all permit recovery for deaths
incurred during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
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tion. Certainty of exemption would not only benefit both insured and
insurer but would minimize the need for judicial construction.3
It is obviously impossible, however, to re-write exemption clauses
in the course of current litigation. But careful and accurate analysis
and presentation of the problem from the standpoint of the purpose of
the exemption clause, 0 where construction may be necessary, should avoid
further chaos that might arise from attempting to match definitions or
from the comparison of verbiage. Correct analysis should first involve
an inquiry as to whether any construction is necessary; not whether the
clause can possibly be made ambiguous. If the clause is fairly and
objectively ambiguous, however, that ambiguity should be resolved, upon
careful analysis of the exemption, in terms of status, activity, or result.
Particularly to be avoided is the "rewriting" of the clause in terms of
another exemption. When analyzing the exemption, primary attention
should be given to the exemption as a whole, viewed in its entirety. If
it appears, after fair consideration, that statics or activity of the insured,
in contrast to disability resulting from service of war, is the basis of
avoidance of liability, the ordinary rules for each class may then be
applied to achieve a final determination as to whether or not the death
or disability occurred within or without the particular exemption.
W. 0. KROHN
LANDLORD AND TENANT-RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION BY
LANDLORD--WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT OF ACTION FOR FORCIBLE DETAINER
IS IN TRUSTEE OR IN BENEFICIARY OF A LAND TRusT-The case of Liberty
National Bank of Chicago v. Kosterlitz1 presented a novel problem con-
cerning the respective rights of a trustee and a beneficiary under a land
trust to maintain an action for forcible entry and detainer; a problem
made more complicated because of the existence of certain regulations
promulgated by the Office of Price Administration. Title to the premises
involved had been vested in the plaintiff, as trustee, under a typical land
trust agreement which declared that the right of the beneficiary was
simply one of personal property nature and gave him no legal or equitable
interest in the real estate. The defendant had been a tenant from month
39 Changing methods of warfare, new means of starting or "declaring" war, as
well as increased civilian participation in war activities pose additional problems
for the framers of exemption clauses.
40 1. e., was the purpose to avoid liability for any death; for death from any rea-
son all the time insured is a soldier, sailor, or marine; only for the extra hazard
while insured is actively performing military duties; or for death occurring as a
result of military duties; or for death from an act of war, even as applied to
civilians; or for death from any other specific hazard?
1329 Ill. App. 244, 67 N. E. (2d) 876 (1946).
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to month, had been served with notice of termination of tenancy by the
beneficiary acting as agent for the trustee, and, upon failure to vacate,
had been sued for possession of the premises by the trustee under authority
of a certificate of eviction issued by OPA in the name of the beneficiary.
Summary judgment in the trial court in favor of plaintiff was reversed
on appeal by defendant on the ground that the trustee, although possessed
of the right to sue under local law, lacked the necessary authority under
OPA regulations in the absence of a certificate issued in the name of the
trustee, and the existence of such a certificate favoring the beneficiary of
the trust was of no consequence since the latter could have no right of
action under local law.
As the existence of a proper OPA certificate issued in the name of
the plaintiff would seem, by the decision, to be an essential prerequisite
to an action for possession and not just a mere procedural technicality,'
the first question presented is whether or not such a certificate could be
obtained by one who merely holds title in trust for another. The rent
regulations presently direct that such certificate shall be issued to the
"landlord" upon compliance with certain requirements not here material,
and the term "landlord" is therein defined to be "an owner, lessor,
sublessor, assignee or other person receiving or entitled to receive rent
for the use or occupancy of any housing accommodations or an agent of
any of the foregoing."I While no construction has been given to these
provisions by the courts as yet, it would seem that a person vested with
the rights and powers ordinarily conferred upon a trustee should be
entitled to have such a certificate. In Wahl v. Schmidt,4 for example,
it was indicated that, at least in a court of law, a trustee holding the
legal title together with the right to possession was to be regarded as
"owner" of the premises, having all the rights and subject to all the
liabilities attaching to ownership. Whether a trustee can be said to be
a person "entitled to receive rent" for the premises, so as to come within
the definition of "landlord," is, however, a matter entirely dependent
upon the terms of the trust agreement. If the agreement, as in the instant
case, gives to the beneficiary the control of the management of the
property, including renting thereof and the collection and handling of
rents, a strict construction of the regulation in question would lead to
the conclusion that the trustee, while holder of the legal title, is not a
person "receiving or entitled to receive rent" from the premises, hence
20. P. A. Maximum Rent Regulation No. 28, § 6(B) (2) (1), requires the pur-
chaser of rented premises desiring to occupy the same personally to obtain such a
certificate before pursuing his remedies under local law to oust the tenant.
3 Ibid., § 13(a).
4 307 Ill. 331, 138 N. E. 604 (1923). See also, Randolph v. Hinck, 288 Il. 99, 123
N. E. 273 (1919).
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could not procure the necessary certificate.' If so, and the necessary
certificate is to be issued solely to the beneficiary, the problem then becomes
one as to whether or not the beneficiary may maintain the action, for if
he cannot and the trustees cannot get the requisite certificate it would
seem that the resulting stalemate would prevent ouster of the tenant.
The prime issue in every action for forcible entry and detainer is
one concerning the right to possession,6 for questions concerning title
are immaterial 7 and may not be determined therein.8  That it is the right
to possession which must be emphasized is borne out by the cases which
hold that it is the lessee who should sue the hold-over tenant9 rather than
the lessor, since the latter, after lease granted, no longer has the right
to possession.10 If the beneficiary can be said to enjoy the right to possess
and likewise holds the requisite certificate, it would seem to follow that
the action can be successfully maintained by him, provided he sues in
his own name but in his capacity as beneficiary. Recourse to the trust
instrument will be necessary to establish the beneficiary's right to
possession so careful analysis of its terms would be highly desirable. The
court in the instant case, although by way of dictum, indicated that the
common provisions found in the usual land trust agreement" gave the
5 The court in the instant case concluded that the declaration in the trust agree-
ment that the beneficiary's interest was solely personal property overrode the pro-
visions therein regarding management, so as to prevent the beneficiary from being
"landlord" to the defendant: 329 Ill. App. 244 at 246, 67 N. E. (2d) 876 at 877.
It is understood that the Regional Office of the Chicago Defense Rental Area, per-
haps on the theory that if the beneficiary is not "landlord" then the trustee must
be, has now issued a certificate of eviction in the name of the trustee, plaintiff in
the instant case.
6 11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 57, § 2. See also Biebel Roofing Co. v. Pritchett, 373 Ill.
214, 25 N. E. (2d) 800 (1940) ; West Side Tr. & Say. Bank v. Lopoten, 358 Ill. 631,
193 N. E. 462 (1934).
7 Palmer v. Frank, 169 Ill. 90, 48 N. E. 426 (1897).
8 Davis v. Robinson, 374 Ill. 553, 30 N. E. (2d) 52 (1940).
9 Allen v. Webster, 56 Ill. 393 (1870) ; Travis v. Geiger, 215 Ill. App. 461 (1919)
Geo. J. Cooke Co. v. Kaiser, 163 Il. App. 210 (1911).
1O Gazzolo v. Chambers, 73 Ill. 75 (1874).
11 The instant agreement provided, among other things, that "the interest of any
beneficiary hereunder shall consist solely of a power of direction to deal with the
title of said property and to manage and control said property as hereinafter pro-
vided. and the right to receive the proceeds from rentals and from mortgages, sales
or other disposition of said premises, and that such right in the avails of said
property shall be deemed to be personal property, and may be assigned and trans-
ferred as such . . . and that no beneficiary now has, and that no beneficiary here-
under at any time shall have any right, title or interest in or to any portion of said
real estate as such, either legal or equitable, but only an interest in the earnings,
avails and proceeds as aforesaid." It also provided that the "beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries hereunder, in his, her or their own right shall have the management of
said property and control of the selling, renting and handling thereof, and shall
collect and handle the rents, earnings, avails and proceeds thereof, and said trustee
shall have no duty in respect to such management or control, or the collection,
handling or application of such rents, earnings, avails or proceeds, or in respect to
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beneficiary no rights in the real estate or its possession since the beneficiary
had nothing which could be made the subject of a lease to a tenant unless
any lease negotiated by the beneficiary was made by him as agent for
the trustee. It cited only one case in support of that view, that of Chicago
Title & Trust Company v. Mercantile Trust & Savings Bank,12 which
case is not squarely in point for the issue there was whether or not a
judgment against a beneficiary was superior to the lien of a mortgage
subsequently executed by the trustee. No question of the right of the
beneficiary to possession of the premises was involved therein, hence the
support from such a case is slender. The inference to be drawn from
other cases, also involving land trusts of the type here concerned, wherein
the trustee has been isolated from liability for personal injury to persons
coming on the premises because of absence of possession, control or
management,13 would seem to dictate an opposite conclusion.
The suggested conflict between these decisions makes the instant case
even more unique, for if credit is given to both views then neither trustee
nor beneficiary has the right to possession. As all the rights incident to
property ownership were once vested in the settlor of such a trust, he
must have, by the terms of the conveyance and the trust indenture,
transferred them to the trustee and the beneficiary jointly or divided
such rights between them. If the beneficiary is also the settlor, as here,
the agreement would not confer rights on him but such rights would
be regarded as reserved unless clearly given to the trustee. 1 4  It cannot
be supposed that the beneficiary, having been given the right or having
reserved the right to manage and control the property, including the
renting and handling thereof, acts simply as agent for the trustee, 5
so it should follow that such a beneficiary is vested with the right to
possession unless the arrangement indicates the contrary. If the trustee
is charged with the duty of management, it could well be implied that
possession should be vested in him"5 in order that such duty might be
the payment of taxes or assessments or in respect to insurance, litigation or other-
wise, except on written direction as hereinabove provided, and after the payment to
it of all money necessary to carry out said instructions." Such provisions are be-
lieved to be typical of trust agreements covering land in the Chicago area.
12 300 Ill. App. 329, 20 N. E. (2d) 992 (1939).
13 Brazowski v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 280 Ill. App. 293, leave to appeal denied
280 Il. App. xiii (1935), noted in 13 CHIOAGo-KENT RE'vriw 383; Whitaker v. Cen-
tral Trust Co., 270 Ill. App. 614 (1933), abst. opin.
14 Irish v. Antioch College, 126 Ill. 474, 18 N. E. 768 (1888) ; Equitable Trust Co.
v. Fisher, 106 Ill. 189 (1883).
15 Gallagher & Speck v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 238 Ill. App. 39 (1925).
16 Perry, Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 1. § 329. See also Yates v. Yates, 255 Ill. 66,
99 N. E. 360, Ann. Cas. 1913D 143 (1912) ; MNcDale v. Shepardson, 53 Ill. App. 513
(1893), appeal dismissed 156 Ill. 383, 40 N. E. 953 (1895); Williamson v. Wilkins,
14 Ga. 416 (1854) ; Ellis v. Woodruff, 88 Kan. 734, 129 P. 1193 (1913).
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performed, but if the plain intention is otherwise all such considerations
must give .way17 unless the parties, by their conduct, have furnished their
own interpretation of the situation.18
These views are not affected by such decisions as that in Continental
Illinois National Bank & Trust Company v. Windsor Amusement Com-
pany,'9 for the court there relied upon a special provision, not typically
found in land trust agreements, to the effect that "the trustee is the sole
owner . . . and so far as the public is concerned has full power to
deal" with the property, as warranting suit for possession by the trustee
against a hold-over tenant. The term "public" in such provision was
held to include persons in the defendant's position, but without such
clause it is doubtful if that result would have been obtained. The holding
in Chicago, North Shore & Milwaukee Railway Company v. Chicago Title
& Trust Company,20 a condemnation action in which it was regarded as
unnecessary to make the beneficiary a party defendant because the trust
agreement declared his interest to be personal property only, is likewise
not controlling for the agreement there gave the power of management
to a third person.
The law can well be assumed to be, therefore, that the right to
possession may be in the beneficiary and that he, by virtue of such right,
is entitled to bring a forcible entry and detainer action to recover
possession of trust premises. The instant case, however, does serve as a
warning that care must be exercised in undertaking such an action as
to real estate held in trust. J. P. RAUScmRT
17 For cases where, by express language in the trust agreement, the beneficiary
was given the right to possession, see: Lethbridge v. Lethbridge, 3 DeG. F. & J.
523, 45 Eng. Rep. 981 (1861); Freeman v. Cook, 14 N. C. 373 (1848); Lewis v.
Henry's Ex'ors, 69 Va. (28 Grat.) 192 (1877). See also Bogert, Trusts and Trustees,
Vol. 3, § 583. For cases where, from the surrounding circumstances, it could be said
that the beneficiary had the right to possession, see: Glover v. Stamps, 73 Ga. 209
(1884) ; Fernstler v. Seiberg, 114 Pa. 196, 6 A. 165 (1886) ; School Directors v.
Dunkleberger, 6 Pa. (Burr) 29 (1847).
18 The record in the instant case would indicate that rent, after attornment, had
been paid by checks made payable to the trustee and all requisite notices, etc., had
been given by the beneficiary as agent for the trustee. Such conduct may serve to
disclose that the parties themselves regarded the trustee as the one having the right
to possession. If so, the court's statement that the beneficiary had no right to sue
must be regarded as being correct under the circumstances.
19 288 Ill. App. 57, 5 N. E. (2d) 606 (1936).
20 328 Ill. 610, 160 N. E. 226 (1928).
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MASTER AND SERVANT-SERVICES AND COMPENSATION-WHETHER OR
NOT REFUSAL OF UNION WORKER TO A CCEPT NONUNION EMPLOYMENT
DISQUALIFIES FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-In the recent Ohio
case of Chambers v. Owens-Ames-Kimball Company,' plaintiff was an
unemployed union carpenter drawing benefits under the local Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act.2 Being able to work and available for work,
as required by the pertinent provision of the statute,3 he was referred to
a nonunion job as a carpenter. He refused the proffered employment
on the ground that, as acceptance of the nonunion job would violate the
rules of his union,4 and would subject him to expulsion, 5 he was excused
from accepting the employment by a statutory provision6 which provided
that an individual shall not lose the right to benefits by reason of a
refusal to accept new work, if, "as a condition of being so employed,"
he would be denied the right to retain his membership in the union and
to observe its lawful rules. The Board of Review of the Bureau of
Unemployment Compensation interpreted "condition" to refer to re-
strictions and qualifications contained in the offer of employment made
by the employer to the prospective employee, and did not mean "result"
of being so employed as plaintiff contended. From an order suspending
the employment benefits, plaintiff appealed to the Common Pleas Court,.
where the order of the administrative tribunal was affirmed. The Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the cause,7 and the
case came before the Ohio Supreme Court upon motion to certify the
record of the intermediate court. The Supreme Court, two justices
dissenting, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirmed
that of the Common Pleas on the ground that "condition," as used in
the statute, was the equivalent of "requisite" or "requirement," and
1 146 Ohio St. 559, 67 N. E. (2d) 439 (1946). Zimmerman, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion, concurred in by Bell, J.
2 Ohio Gen. Code, § 1345-1 et seq., 119 Ohio Laws 836.
3 Ibid., § 1345-6 a (4).
4 § 7, C of the trade rules of the local union provided that no members "will be
permitted to work on jobs where nonunion carpenters are working, or for employer
[sic] who employs nonunion carpenters." See 146 Ohio St. 559 at 560, 67 N. E. (2d)
439 at 440.
5 The union rules provided that any "officer or member who wilfully ... violates
the trade rules of the locality in which he is working .. . may be fined, suspended
or expelled, as the local union may decide." See 146 Ohio St. 559 at 560, 67 N. E.(2d) 439 at 440.
6 Ohio Gen. Code, § 1345-6a(1), 119 Ohio Laws 836, declares that "No individual
otherwise qualified to receive benefits shall lose the right to benefits by reason of a
refusal to accept new work if: (1) As a condition of being so employed, he would
be required to join a company union, or to resign from or refrain from joining any
bonafide labor organization, or would be denied the right to retain membership in
and observe the lawful rules of any such organization."
7 44 Ohio Law Abs. 146, 62 N. E. (2d) 496 (1945).
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that to hold otherwise would permit the statute to operate in an un-
constitutional manner through the discrimination that would result by
granting benefits to a union worker while denying them to a nonunion
worker under similar circumstances.
State unemployment laws generally provide that an individual, to
be eligible for benefits, must be able to work and must be available for
work; and that an individual shall be ineligible for benefits if he has
failed, without good cause, to accept suitable work when the same is
offered. A clause usually enumerates a number of factors which shall
be considered when determining the suitability of work. In addition
to these, all state laws contain a clause, corresponding to the so-called
"labor standards provision" of the Internal Revenue Code," which in
substance provides that "Notwithstanding any other provisions of this
Act, no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied
under this Act to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept
new work . . . (c) if as a condition of being employed the individual
would be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain
from joining any bona fide labor organization. "9
One author, when interpreting this provision, has stated that where
the employee would be forced to resign from a union, he would not be
disqualified from receiving benefits if he refused the employment; but
where he would be expelled from tho union, disqualification will follow,
for the expulsion is a result of, and is not required as a condition to,
being employed. He has recommended, however, that regardless of the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the union rule, a finding should
be made that the individual had good cause for refusing the employment,
since loss of status is a substantial harm to him.'"
The decision in Barclay White Company v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board of Review" accords with this recommendation, for the claimant
there, referred to a job as a ship's carpenter, refused the employment
after notice by the secretary-treasurer of the union that acceptance of the
referral would result in the member's suspension. It was held that
although the work was suitable within the meaning of the act, the
claimant refused it with good cause and was therefore not disqualified
from benefits. The court said that the rights which membership in a
union confers upon its members constitute property so valuable that
equity will restrain against their impairment.
826 U. S. C. A. § 1603(a) (5).
9 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 223(c) (2).
:LOA. M. Menard, "Refusal of Suitable Work," 55 Yale L. J. 134 (1945), particu-
larly p. 143.
11 Pa. Super. Ct., 1946, CCH Unemployment Insurance Service 8140.
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
Of a contrary tenor, however, is the decision in Bigger v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission.12 There, plaintiff, an unemployed union
painter, declined a nonunion job and justified his refusal, among other
reasons, by reliance on the non-disqualification clause in the Delaware
Act. He contended that the words "condition of being employed" should
be interpreted to mean a condition which inheres in the entering upon
or carrying out of the employment, as distinguished from a condition
imposed by an employer. The court, holding the employment to be
suitable and denying compensation, said that the interpretation sought
by the plaintiff could not be attained by judicial construction, but that
resort must be had to legislative sanction. It also pointed out that the
phrases "resign from" and "expelled from" are not analogous, but
opposed to each other.
In a number of other instances, courts in passing upon the justifica-
tion of a refusal to work, have as a rule denied benefits on the ground
that the claimant was not available for work."3 Thus in Huiet v. Schwob
Manufacturing Company" the claimant left her job to follow her husband
to a military camp, where she was unsuccessful in finding employment.
Upon notice of a claim for benefits, her former employer advised that
her former position was still open. She refused to return and was
disqualified on the ground that she was not available for employment
previously held. In Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment Compensation.
Commission15 the applicant was a married woman who had been employed
on the third shift. Desiring to devote some time to her family, she
refused to work on shifts other than the first or second. The court held
that limited availability for work disqualified her from benefits. Like-
wise in Kut v. Albers Super Markets, Inc.,16 the applicant, a member of
the orthodox Jewish faith, refused Saturday employment and was dis-
qualified from benefits on the ground that he was not available for work.
These latter cases illustrate the decision that may be expected when
the refusal is a matter of independent choice and is not dictated by
considerations imposed from without. In the instant case, however, the
plaintiff was not at liberty to accept the nonunion employment without
risk of serious consequences. In view of the fact that courts have upheld
the right of labor unions to prohibit their members from working with
12 46 A. (2d) (Del. Super. Ct.) 137 (1946).
13 See the cases collected in an annotation to Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Cor-
poration, 219 Minn. 306, 18 N. W. (2d) 249 (1945) to be found in 158 A. L. R. 396.
14 196 Ga. 855, 27 S. E. (2d) 743 (1943).
15 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. (2d) 535 (1944).
16 76 Ohio App. 51, 63 N. E. (2d) 218 (1945), noted in 24 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW
Rm'IEw 281 (1946).
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nonunion men and to enforce such rules through fines or expulsion, 7
it is submitted that the result reached by the instant case is not satis-
factory from the hapless employee's standpoint, for he is, as it were,
caught in the middle between conflicting alternatives. The court, it
seems, could well find that, whether the loss of union status is demanded
as a condition of employment or comes as a result of the employment,
the employee had good cause for refusing the tendered work. The only
other alternative is to deny the power of unions to make and to enforce
rules prohibiting their members from accepting nonunion employment.
It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the Illinois Un-
employment Compensation Act' s contains a non-disqualification clause
similar to the federal labor standards provision.19 Although not judicially
construed as yet, the decision of the Board of Review in the matter of
Dunbar v. Biggs20 is typical. There, the claimant, a steam fitter, was
referred to a contractor who had not qualified under the rules of the
union to which the employee belonged. Informed by his union that he
would be subject to disciplinary action if he accepted the employment,
the claimant did not report for work. It was held that there was good
cause for refusing the work, for the principle seems to be established in
Illinois, at least to the Director's satisfaction, that work is not suitable
if its acceptance will jeopardize the employee's union relations, especially
where the main reliance for a livelihood is placed on such an affiliation.
However, since the most recent employer is a party to the determination
of the claimant's eligibility for benefits, 21 and can appeal to the courts
from an adverse ruling after his administrative remedies are exhausted, 22
the matter may yet be made the basis of judicial determination in this
state.2 3  J. E. GALT
17 Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers', etc., Local U. No. 1, 92 Conn. 161,
101 A. 659, 6 A. L. R. 887 (1917); Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582,
Ann. Cas. 1918D 661 (1917).
1a Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 217 et seq.
19 Ibid., § 223(c) (2).
20 See Decision No. 46-BRD-425 (46-RD-1800), May 2, 1946.
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 225(b).
22 Ibid., § 230.
2.3 The employer in Biggs v. Dunbar is now seeking judicial reversal of the deci-
sion of the Board of Review. See case No. 46C-7058, Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois.
